

# Introduction to Cryptography

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
JOHNS HOPKINS  
U N I V E R S I T Y

# Cryptography

- from art to science
- more than just encryption
- essential today for non-military applications

# Symmetric Crypto

Shared secret  $K \Rightarrow$  Eve can't eavesdrop



# Classic Ciphers

## The Shift Cipher

$A = 0, B = 1, C = 2, \dots, Z = 25$

$$x, y, k \in \mathbb{Z}_{26}$$

$$e_k(x) = x + k \bmod 26$$

$$d_k(y) = y - k \bmod 26$$



# The Shift Cipher

$A = 0, B = 1, C = 2, \dots, Z = 25$

$$x, y, k \in \mathbb{Z}_{26}$$

$$e_k(x) = x + k \bmod 26$$

$$d_k(y) = y - k \bmod 26$$

Cryptanalysis? Try  
13 times on average.

Example ( $K = 11$ ):

|    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|
| W  | E  | W  | I  | L  | L  | M  | E  | E  | T  | A  | T  | M  | I  | D  | N  | I  | G  | H  | T  |
| 22 | 4  | 22 | 8  | 11 | 11 | 12 | 4  | 4  | 19 | 0  | 19 | 12 | 8  | 3  | 13 | 8  | 6  | 7  | 19 |
| ↓  | ↓  | ↓  | ↓  | ↓  | ↓  | ↓  | ↓  | ↓  | ↓  | ↓  | ↓  | ↓  | ↓  | ↓  | ↓  | ↓  | ↓  | ↓  | ↓  |
| 7  | 15 | 7  | 19 | 22 | 22 | 23 | 15 | 15 | 4  | 11 | 4  | 23 | 19 | 14 | 24 | 19 | 17 | 18 | 4  |
| H  | P  | H  | T  | W  | W  | X  | P  | P  | E  | L  | E  | X  | T  | O  | Y  | T  | R  | S  | E  |


Example from D.R. Stinson (CRC Press)

# The Substitution Cipher

|   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | K | L | M | N | O | P | Q | R | S | T | U | V | W | X | Y | Z |
| ↓ | ↓ | ↓ | ↓ | ↓ | ↓ | ↓ | ↓ | ↓ | ↓ | ↓ | ↓ | ↓ | ↓ | ↓ | ↓ | ↓ | ↓ | ↓ | ↓ | ↓ | ↓ | ↓ | ↓ | ↓ | ↓ |
| X | N | Y | A | H | P | O | G | Z | Q | W | B | T | S | F | L | R | C | V | M | U | E | K | J | D | I |

|   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| W | E | W | I | L | L | M | E | E | T | A | T | M | I | D | N | I | G | H | T |
| ↓ | ↓ | ↓ | ↓ | ↓ | ↓ | ↓ | ↓ | ↓ | ↓ | ↓ | ↓ | ↓ | ↓ | ↓ | ↓ | ↓ | ↓ | ↓ | ↓ |
| K | H | K | Z | B | B | T | H | H | M | X | M | T | Z | A | S | Z | O | G | M |

Cryptanalysis? Try all substitutions:  $26! > 4.0 \times 10^{26}$ .  
 Can cut down with probabilities of occurrence.



Example from D.R. Stinson (CRC Press)

# One-Time Pad



key  $K$

Can only use key once



key  $K$

$$M \oplus K$$

$$|M| = |K|$$



Cryptanalysis? Perfectly secure ... but really expensive.

# Diffie & Hellman's Vision



Whitfield Diffie



Martin Hellman


From "New Directions in Cryptography" 1976:

1. key exchange
2. public-key encryption
3. public-key signatures



# Idea #1: Key Exchange

Setup shared secret **K** over **insecure** channel.



# A Little Number Theory

Let  $Q$  be a large prime.

$g$  generates a group  $G$  of order  $Q$ .

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Example:

$$Q = 3, g = 2, G = \{1, 2, 4\} \pmod{7}$$

$$2^1=2 \quad 2^2=4 \quad 2^3=1 \quad \pmod{7}$$

# A Little Number Theory

We think the following problems are hard.

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Discrete Log Problem:

Given  $(g, g^x)$  for random  $x$ , compute  $x$ .

Diffie-Hellman Problem:


Given  $(g, g^x, g^y)$  for random  $x, y$ , compute  $g^{xy}$ .

Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) Problem:

Given  $(g, g^x, g^y, Q)$  for random  $x, y$ ,  
decide if  $Q = g^{xy}$ .

# The DH Key Exchange

Setup shared secret  $K$  over **insecure** channel.



Open: given  $(g, g^a, g^b)$ , quickly compute  $g^{ab}$ .

# Diffie & Hellman's Vision



Whitfield Diffie



Martin Hellman

From "New Directions in Cryptography":


1. key exchange ✓
2. public-key encryption - ??
3. public-key signatures - ??

# Inspiration

Observation about world:


*It is sometimes asymmetric.*

- Easy to break vase,  
hard to put it back together.
- Anyone can close a safe,  
but need the combination to open it.




# Idea #2: Public-Key Encryption

Encrypt without a shared secret.



# Idea #2: Public-Key Encryption

Encrypt without a shared secret.





# Idea #3: Digital Signatures

Dear Tal,  
Do you want to  
go to a movie on  
Friday night?

--John

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "John Hancock", is displayed on a light pink rectangular background. A thin green vertical line is visible to the left of the signature.

1976 Diffie-Hellman: dream of digital signatures

# Idea #3: Digital Signatures

Dear Tal,  
Do you want to  
go to a movie on  
Friday night?

--John

1adh84naf89hq32nvsd8  
puwqhevhpvdfp9ufew7  
u2rasdfohaqsedhfdasjf;

1976 Diffie-Hellman: dream of digital signatures

2000 Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act

# Idea #3: Public-Key Signatures

Authenticate without a shared secret.



public **PK**



**PK**

secret **SK**

$s = \text{Sign}(\text{SK}, m)$

$s$



$\text{Verify}(\text{PK}, m, s) = 1$




can't forge!

# The RSA Realization (1978)

Rivest

Shamir

Adleman



# The RSA Realization

Hard problem:

Let  $N = pq$ .

Given  $(N, y, e)$ , find the  $x$  s.t.  $e > 1$  and  $y = x^e \bmod N$ .

Public Key  $PK = (N, e)$

Secret Key  $SK = d$

$\text{Enc}(N, e, m): c = m^e \bmod N$

$\text{Dec}(d, c): m = c^d \bmod N$

$\text{Sign}(d, m): s = m^d \bmod N$

$\text{Verify}(N, e, m, s): \text{Accept iff}$   
 $m = s^e \bmod N$



Is this "secure"?

# Insecurity of textbook RSA



Enc( $N, e, m$ ):  $c = m^e \bmod N$

Dec( $d, c$ ):  $m = c^d \bmod N$

Sign( $d, m$ ):  $s = m^d \bmod N$

Verify( $N, e, m, s$ ): Accept iff  
 $m = s^e \bmod N$

Encryption: Can do a (small) dictionary attack.

Signatures: Given signatures on  $m_1$  and  $m_2$ ,  
can compute signature on  $m_1 m_2$ .

Can Fix. But, what exactly do we mean by "secure"?



# Goldwasser-Micali Definition



## Encryption Security



PK



$m_0, m_1$

$c_b$

$b'$

Pick bit  $b$ .

$c_b = \text{Enc}(\text{PK}, m_b)$

$\Pr[b=b'] \leq 1/2 + \text{a very small amount}$

# El Gamal Encryption



Public Key:  $(g, g^a)$

Secret Key:  $a$



$\text{Enc}(g, g^a, m)$ :

1. pick a random  $k$
2.  $c1 = g^k$
3.  $c2 = mg^{ak}$

$(c1, c2)$

$\text{Dec}(a, c1, c2)$ :

1.  $m = c2 / c1^a$



Secure if: given  $(g, g^a, g^b, Q)$ , it is hard to decide if  $Q = g^{ab}$ .



# Complexity Assumptions

Modern Crypto is built on number-theoretic assumptions.

Results look like:

Theorem: System  $X$  satisfies Definition  $Y$  under Assumption  $Z$ .

Technical Challenges:

1. Designing definitions that capture all attacks.
2. Creating systems.
3. Cryptanalysis of assumptions.

# What else?

Next time we'll see something totally different:

zero-knowledge proofs.

