

Trust? In *my* hardware? It's more likely than you think.

HEART Computer Security and Privacy for the Modern World

♥ EN.600.111(33)

September 30, 2021

Tushar Jois



Trust? In *my* hardware? It's more likely than you think.

HEART Computer Security and Privacy for the Modern World

♥ EN.600.111(26)

October 6, 2021

Tushar Jois



Recap

- Symmetric encryption prevents evesdroppers from reading a message
- Diffie-Hellman key exchange helps parties agree on a shared secret
- Transport Layer Security (TLS) combines key exchange, encryption, and digital signatures to provide security


Lesson objectives


- Explain how trusted hardware can be used to provide secure execution on cloud environments
- Use an execution trace to identify microarchitectural side-channels
- Apply data-oblivious computation to close side-channels


Exit ticket from last time

*Cryptography requires the use of a secret key for encryption and signing.
How can we use Unix systems security to protect this secret key from being
attacked/leaked?*


Unix isolation








Important, sensitive data (e.g., genomics)



Idea: Trusted execution environments

Trusted execution environment

- A separate “part” of the processor
 - Untrusted applications run normally
 - Trusted applications run in an *enclave*
- When a processor computes on an enclave, it encrypts its memory
 - The operating system can't access the memory/data unless it has the processor's key
- Enclaves can use *remote attestation*
 - The processor signs what it's executing
 - You can be sure nothing has changed
- Feature requires hardware support
 - Combines cryptography and systems security together



University 1

Input i_1 01000101
01000101

University 2

Input i_2 10111010
10111010



An enclave allows the processor to run code without the interference of the operating system

Simulates a trusted third-party that does computation on behalf of the rest of the group

Result r
1101

minimizing trust

Trusted hardware

Utilize features of hardware to provide additional security beyond traditional software mechanisms such as operating system isolation.

University 1

Input i_1 01000101
01000101

University 2

Input i_2 10111010
10111010




Result r
1101

```
# Side-channel Vulnerable
# Assume x1, x2 are private
```

```
if x1 and x2:
    print(1)
else:
    print(0)
```


Execution Trace



```
# Side-channel Vulnerable
# Assume x1, x2 are private
```

```
if x1 and x2:
    print(1)
else:
    print(0)
```

Execution Trace



microarchitectural side-channel

An attacker can infer the inputs of an operation by looking at the state of the processor during its execution.



```
# Side-channel Vulnerable
# Assume x1, x2 are private
```

```
if x1 and x2:
    print(1)
else:
    print(0)
```

```
# Fixing the vulnerability
```

```
print(x1 & x2)
```

Execution Trace



minimizing trust

Data-oblivious computation

When working with secure hardware, write a program execution with the same observable characteristics regardless of the inputs provided, thus preventing microarchitectural side channel attacks.

```
# Side-channel Vulnerable  
# Assume x1, x2 are private
```



```
if x1 and x2:  
    print(1)  
else:  
    print(0)
```

```
# Fixed (under assumptions)
```

```
print(x1 & x2)
```

Let's try it!


Execution Trace



```
# Side-channel Vulnerable
# Assume x1, x2 are private
```

```
if x1 and x2:
    print(1)
else:
    print(0)
```

Execution Trace



For each function on the right:

- Draw the execution trace on the whiteboard
- Determine if the function is data-oblivious using the execution trace

```
def func1(x):
    y = 4
    if x == 6:
        y = 6
    return y
```

```
def func2(x):
    y = 0
    if x == 6:
        y = 6
    else:
        y = 4
    return y
```

```
def func3(x):
    y = 1
    if x == 4:
        y = 7
    else:
        y = 0
    return y
```


Key insight:

data-oblivious →


data-unnecessary

Assuming a **data-oblivious** function



Assuming a **data-oblivious** function



\approx



Assuming a **data-oblivious** function



DOVE: A Data-Oblivious Virtual Environment

Hyun Bin Lee, [Tushar M. Jois](#), Christopher W. Fletcher, Carl A. Gunter
Network and Distributed Security Symposium 2021 (NDSS '21)

Function f

Input i_1 01000101
01000101

Result r_1

000110100100

Input i_1 01000101
01000101

Separate the execution of a script from the actual operations on sensitive data

Replay Execution Trace on a Dataset

Result r_1

000110100100

Data Oblivious Transcript

??????
????????

Looking ahead

- We're going to pivot from talking about security to talking about privacy
- Do the reading: "Tor Overview" article and video
 - If you can, skim through the optional "Meteor: Cryptographically Secure Steganography for Realistic Distributions"
- Exit ticket before class is done

Lesson objectives

- Explain how hardware can be used to provide trusted execution environments
- Use an execution trace to identify microarchitectural side-channels
- Apply data-oblivious computation to close side-channels