

# BAN Logic Reading Guide

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Belief Logic is a process by which we can analyze protocols in a logical manner. We are not so much looking to prove these protocols secure; instead we wish to show that our authentication goals have been achieved. The symbols and constructs that we will use are listed below.

The symbols  $A$ ,  $B$  and  $S$  denote specific principals. Principals can be people, computers or services.  $K_{AB}$ ,  $K_{AS}$ ,  $K_{BS}$  denote symmetric secret keys shared between  $A$  and  $B$ ,  $A$  and  $S$ , and  $B$  and  $S$ , respectively.  $K_A$ ,  $K_B$ ,  $K_S$  denote the public keys of  $A$ ,  $B$ , and  $S$ , while the inverses of these keys (e.g.  $K_{A^{-1}}$ ) represents each principal's private key. The symbols  $N_A$ ,  $N_B$  and  $N_S$  identify nonces as well as their creator.  $X$  and  $Y$  are statements or messages. The following constructs are used to show the usage and relationship for all principals, keys and statements.

$P \models X$ :  $P$  believes that  $X$  is true.

$P \triangleleft X$ : At some point in time (past or present)  $P$  received some message  $X$

$P \vdash X$ : At some point in time  $P$  sent  $X$ . Also, at the time of sending,  $P$  believed  $X$ .

$P \Rightarrow X$ :  $P$  has jurisdiction over  $X$ , meaning other principals believe  $X$  if they believe  $P$  believes  $X$ .

$\sharp(X)$ :  $X$  is fresh.  $X$  has not been sent at any time before the current run of the protocol. Nonces are expressions generated to prove freshness, and often include a timestamp. Without nonces, it is possible to get that not so fresh message feeling.

$P \stackrel{K}{\leftrightarrow} Q$ :  $P$  and  $Q$  share the key  $K$  and may use it to communicate. Furthermore,  $K$  will never be discovered by any principal except  $P$ ,  $Q$  or a principal trusted by  $P$  or  $Q$ .

$\stackrel{K}{\mapsto} P$ :  $P$  has public key  $K$ . The private key  $K^{-1}$  will only ever been known to  $P$  or principals trusted by  $P$ .

$\{X\}_K$ : Represents  $X$  encrypted under key  $K$ . When  $K$  is a private key (e.g.  $K_{A^{-1}}$ ) this represents a signature of  $X$ .

1. *Message meaning* rules concern the interpretation of messages. Rather than using the new symbols, we will write the English equivalents.

When using shared keys,

$$\frac{P \text{ believes } Q \stackrel{K}{\leftrightarrow} P, \quad P \text{ has seen } \{X\}_K}{P \text{ believes } Q \text{ once said } X}$$

When public keys are used,

$$\frac{P \text{ believes } \stackrel{K}{\mapsto} Q, \quad P \text{ has seen } \{X\}_{K^{-1}}}{P \text{ believes } Q \text{ once said } X}$$

2. *Nonce-verification* rules show how to check that a message is fresh, and that the senders believes so as well:

$$\frac{P \text{ believes } X \text{ is fresh, } P \text{ believes } Q \text{ once said } X}{P \text{ believes } Q \text{ believes } X}$$

3. The *Jurisdiction* rule states that a principal  $P$  will trust the beliefs that  $Q$  has jurisdiction over.

$$\frac{P \text{ believes } Q \text{ controls } X, P \text{ believes } Q \text{ believes } X}{P \text{ believes } X}$$

4. A principal that sees a formula in plaintext, also sees its components:

$$\frac{P \text{ sees } (X, Y)}{P \text{ sees } X}, \frac{P \text{ believes } Q \stackrel{K}{\leftrightarrow} P, P \text{ sees } \{X\}_K}{P \text{ sees } X},$$

$$\frac{P \text{ believes } \stackrel{K}{\mapsto} P, P \text{ sees } \{X\}_K}{P \text{ sees } X}, \frac{P \text{ believes } \stackrel{K}{\mapsto} Q, P \text{ sees } \{X\}_{K^{-1}}}{P \text{ sees } X}.$$

Note that even if  $P$  sees  $X$  and  $P$  sees  $Y$ , then  $P$  does not necessarily see  $(X, Y)$ .

5. If any given part of a formula is fresh (and the formula cannot be altered), the entire formula must be fresh:

$$\frac{P \text{ believes fresh}(X)}{P \text{ believes fresh}(X, Y)}.$$