First Order Logic

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Wittgenstein: Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus [1]

1. The world is everything that is the case.

2. What is the case (a fact) is the existence of states of affairs.

3. A logical picture of facts is a thought.

4. A thought is a proposition with a sense.

5. A proposition is a truth-function of elementary propositions. (An elementary proposition is a truth-function of itself.)

6. The general form of a proposition is the general form of a truth function, which is: $[\bar{p}, \bar{\xi}, N(\bar{\xi})]$. This is the general form of a proposition.

7. Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.

Outline

- Why first order logic?

- Syntax and semantics of first order logic

- Fun with sentences

- Wumpus world in first order logic

why?

- **PRO:** Propositional logic is **declarative**: pieces of syntax correspond to facts

- **PRO:** Propositional logic allows partial/disjunctive/negated information
  (unlike most data structures and databases)

- **PRO:** Propositional logic is **compositional**:
  meaning of $B_{1,1} \wedge P_{1,2}$ is derived from meaning of $B_{1,1}$ and of $P_{1,2}$

- **PRO:** Meaning in propositional logic is **context-independent**
  (unlike natural language, where meaning depends on context)

- **CON:** Propositional logic has very limited expressive power
  (unlike natural language)
  E.g., cannot say "pits cause breezes in adjacent squares"
  except by writing one sentence for each square

First-Order Logic

- Propositional logic: world contains **facts**

- First-order logic: the world contains **objects**, **relations**, and **functions**

- Objects: people, houses, numbers, theories, Ronald McDonald, colors, baseball games, wars, centuries . . .

- Relations: red, round, bogus, prime, multistoried . . .,
brother of, bigger than, inside, part of, has color, occurred after, owns, comes between, . . .

- Functions: father of, best friend, third inning of, one more than, end of . . .

More Logics

Language	Ontological Commitment	Epistemological Commitment
Propositional logic	facts	true/false/unknown
First-order logic	facts, objects, relations	true/false/unknown
Temporal logic	facts, objects, relations, times	true/false/unknown
Probability theory	facts	degree of belief
Fuzzy logic	facts + degree of truth	known interval value

Higher-order logic:

relations and functions operate not only on objects,
but also on relations and functions

syntax and semantics

Syntax of FOL: Basic Elements

- Constants: $KingJohn, 2, UCB, \ldots$

- Predicates: $Brother, >, \ldots$

- Functions: $Sqrt, LeftLegOf, \ldots$

- Variables: $x, y, a, b, \ldots$

- Connectives: $\wedge \vee \neg \implies \Leftrightarrow$

- Equality: $=$

- Quantifiers: $\forall \; \exists$

Atomic Sentences

- Atomic sentence $=$ $predicate(term_1, \ldots, term_n)$
  or $term_1 = term_2$

- Term $=$ $function(term_1, \ldots, term_n)$
  or $constant$ or $variable$

- E.g., $Brother(KingJohn, RichardTheLionheart)$
  $> (Length(LeftLegOf(Richard)), Length(LeftLegOf(KingJohn)))$

Complex Sentences

- Complex sentences are made from atomic sentences using connectives

$$\neg S, \quad S_1 \wedge S_2, \quad S_1 \vee S_2, \quad S_1 \implies S_2, \quad S_1 \Leftrightarrow S_2$$

- For instance

  - $Sibling(KingJohn, Richard) \implies Sibling(Richard, KingJohn)$

  - $>(1,2) \vee \leq(1,2)$

  - $>(1,2) \wedge \neg>(1,2)$

- Sentences are true with respect to a model and an interpretation

- Model contains ≥ 1 objects (domain elements) and relations among them

- Interpretation specifies referents for

  – constant symbols → objects
  – predicate symbols → relations
  – function symbols → functional relations

- An atomic sentence $predicate(term_1, \ldots, term_n)$ is true
  iff the objects referred to by $term_1, \ldots, term_n$
  are in the relation referred to by $predicate$

Models for FOL: Example

- Object symbols

  - *Richard* → Richard the Lionheart
  - *John* → the evil King John

- Predicat symbol

  - *Brother* → the brotherhood relation

- Atomic sentence

  - *Brother*(*Richard, John*)

  true iff Richard the Lionheart and the evil King John
  are in the brotherhood relation in the model

Models for FOL: Lots!

- Entailment in propositional logic can be computed by enumerating models

- We **can** enumerate the FOL models for a given KB vocabulary:

- For each number of domain elements n from 1 to ∞
   For each k-ary predicate P_k in the vocabulary
      For each possible k-ary relation on n objects
         For each constant symbol C in the vocabulary
            For each choice of referent for C from n objects . . .

- Computing entailment by enumerating FOL models is not easy!

Universal Quantification

- Syntax: $\forall \langle variables \rangle \langle sentence \rangle$

- Everyone at JHU is smart:
  $\forall x \; At(x, JHU) \implies Smart(x)$

- $\forall x \; P$ is true in a model m iff P is true with x being **each** possible object in the model

- **Roughly** speaking, equivalent to the conjunction of instantiations of P

$$
\begin{aligned}
& (At(KingJohn, JHU) \implies Smart(KingJohn)) \\
\wedge \; & (At(Richard, JHU) \implies Smart(Richard)) \\
\wedge \; & (At(Jane, JHU) \implies Smart(Jane)) \\
\wedge \; & \ldots
\end{aligned}
$$

- Typically, $\implies$ is the main connective with $\forall$

- Common mistake: using $\wedge$ as the main connective with $\forall$:

$$\forall\, x \quad At(x, JHU) \wedge Smart(x)$$

means "Everyone is at JHU and everyone is smart"▌

- Correct

$$\forall\, x \quad At(x, JHU) \implies Smart(x)$$

means "For everyone, if she is at JHU, then she is smart"

- Syntax: $\exists \langle variables \rangle \; \langle sentence \rangle$

- Someone at JHU is smart:

  $\exists x \; At(x, JHU) \wedge Smart(x)$

- $\exists x \; P$ is true in a model m iff P is true with x being **some** possible object in the model

- **Roughly** speaking, equivalent to the disjunction of instantiations of P

$$
\begin{aligned}
& (At(KingJohn, JHU) \wedge Smart(KingJohn)) \\
\vee \; & (At(Richard, JHU) \wedge Smart(Richard)) \\
\vee \; & (At(JHU, JHU) \wedge Smart(JHU)) \\
\vee \; & \ldots
\end{aligned}
$$

- Typically, $\wedge$ is the main connective with $\exists$

- Common mistake: using $\implies$ as the main connective with $\exists$:

$$\exists x \ At(x, JHU) \implies Smart(x)$$

  is true if there is anyone who is not at JHU

- Correct

$$\exists x \ At(x, JHU) \wedge Smart(x)$$

  is true if there is someone who is at JHU and smart

Properties of Quantifiers

- $\forall x \ \forall y$ is the same as $\forall y \ \forall x$ (why?)

- $\exists x \ \exists y$ is the same as $\exists y \ \exists x$ (why?)

- $\exists x \ \forall y$ is **not** the same as $\forall y \ \exists x$

- $\exists x \ \forall y \ Loves(x, y)$
  "There is a person who loves everyone in the world"

- $\forall y \ \exists x \ Loves(x, y)$
  "Everyone in the world is loved by at least one person"

- Quantifier duality: each can be expressed using the other

- $\forall x \ Likes(x, IceCream)$ $\neg \exists x \ \neg Likes(x, IceCream)$

- $\exists x \ Likes(x, Broccoli)$ $\neg \forall x \ \neg Likes(x, Broccoli)$

- $term_1 = term_2$ is true under a given interpretation
  if and only if $term_1$ and $term_2$ refer to the same object▮

- For instance

  - $1 = 2$ and $\forall x \ \times(Sqrt(x), Sqrt(x)) = x$ are satisfiable

  - $2 = 2$ is true

  (note: syntax does not imply anything about the semantics of 1, 2, $Sqrt(x)$, etc.)▮

- Definition of (full) $Sibling$ in terms of $Parent$

  $\forall x, y \ Sibling(x, y) \ \Leftrightarrow \ [\neg(x = y) \wedge \exists m, f \ \neg(m = f) \wedge$
  $\quad Parent(m, x) \wedge Parent(f, x) \wedge Parent(m, y) \wedge Parent(f, y)]$

fun with sentences

Fun with Sentences

- Brothers are siblings

  $\forall\, x, y\ \ Brother(x, y) \implies Sibling(x, y)$

- "Sibling" is symmetric

  $\forall\, x, y\ \ Sibling(x, y) \iff Sibling(y, x)$

- One's mother is one's female parent

  $\forall\, x, y\ \ Mother(x, y) \iff (Female(x) \land Parent(x, y))$

- A first cousin is a child of a parent's sibling

  $\forall\, x, y\ \ FirstCousin(x, y) \iff \exists p, ps\ \ Parent(p, x) \land Sibling(ps, p) \land Parent(ps, y)$

You can fool all the people some of the time,
and some of the people all the time,
but you cannot fool all the people all the time.

$$\forall\, p \;\; \exists\, t \;\; Fool(p,t)$$
$$\wedge$$
$$\exists\, p \;\; \forall\, t \;\; Fool(p,t)$$
$$\wedge$$
$$\neg \;\; \forall\, p \;\; \forall\, t \;\; Fool(p,t)$$

Donkey Sentences

- *Every farmer owns a donkey.*

  - $\forall f \ (Farmer(f) \wedge \exists d \ (Donkey(d) \wedge Own(f,d)))$
  - $\exists d \ (Donkey(d) \wedge \forall f \ (Farmer(f) \wedge Own(f,d)))$

- *Every human lives on a planet.*

  - $\exists p \ (Planet(p) \wedge \forall h \ (Human(h) \wedge LivesOn(h,p)))$

- *Every farmer who owns a donkey beats it.*

  - $\forall f \ Farmer(f) \wedge \exists d \ (Donkey(d) \wedge Own(f,d) \implies Beats(f,d))$
    but what if a farmer has a donkey d_1 and a pig d_2 and he beats neither
    $Donkey(d_2) \wedge Own(f,d_2) \implies Beats(f,d_2)$ is true ($false \wedge true \implies false$)
  - $\forall f \ \forall d \ (Farmer(f) \wedge Donkey(d) \wedge Own(f,d) \implies Beats(f,d))$
    but this means "Every farmer beats every donkey he owns."

Natural Language

- First order logic is close to the semantics of natural language

- But there are limitations

  - *"There is at least one thing John has in common with Peter."*
    Requires a quantifier over predicates.

  - *"The cake is very good."*
    $\exists c\ Cake(c) \wedge Good(c)$ but not $Very(c)$

    Functions and relations cannot be qualified.

- Natural language sentences are often intentionally vague and ambiguous

wampus world

- "Perception": at current square, three perceptions

  - b either $Breeze$ or $\neg Breeze$
  - s either $Smell$ or $\neg Smell$
  - g either $Glitter$ or $\neg Glitter$

- Shorthands

  - $\forall \, b, g, t \;\; Percept([Smell, b, g], t) \implies Smelt(t)$
  - $\forall \, s, b, t \;\; Percept([s, b, Glitter], t) \implies AtGold(t)$

- Reflex: $\forall \, t \;\; AtGold(t) \implies Action(Grab, t)$

- Reflex with internal state: do we have the gold already?
  $\forall \, t \;\; AtGold(t) \wedge \neg Holding(Gold, t) \implies Action(Grab, t)$

- $Holding(Gold, t)$ cannot be observed
  $\Rightarrow$ keeping track of change is essential

- Properties of locations:
  $$\forall\, x, t \;\; At(Agent, x, t) \wedge Smelt(t) \implies Smelly(x)$$
  $$\forall\, x, t \;\; At(Agent, x, t) \wedge Breeze(t) \implies Breezy(x)\blacksquare$$

- Squares are breezy near a pit

- Diagnostic rule—infer cause from effect
  $$\forall\, y \;\; Breezy(y) \implies \exists\, x \;\; Pit(x) \wedge Adjacent(x, y)$$

- Causal rule—infer effect from cause
  $$\forall\, x, y \;\; Pit(x) \wedge Adjacent(x, y) \implies Breezy(y)\blacksquare$$

- Neither of these is complete—e.g., the causal rule doesn't say whether squares far away from pits can be breezy

- Definition for the $Breezy$ predicate:
  $$\forall\, y \;\; Breezy(y) \Leftrightarrow [\exists\, x \;\; Pit(x) \wedge Adjacent(x, y)]$$

- By acting, the agent moves through a sequence of situations s

- Fluents: aspects of the world that may change

  - current position
  - having an arrow
  - holding the gold

- Taking actions requires updates to the fluents

- Facts hold in situations, rather than eternally
  E.g., $Holding(Gold, Now)$ rather than just $Holding(Gold)$

- Situation calculus is one way to represent change in FOL:
  Adds a situation argument to each non-eternal predicate
  E.g., Now in $Holding(Gold, Now)$ denotes a situation

- Situations are connected by the $Result$ function
  $s' = Result(a, s)$ is the situation that results from doing a in s

Describing Actions

- "Effect" axiom—describe changes due to action
  $$\forall s \ AtGold(s) \implies Holding(Gold, Result(Grab, s))$$

- "Frame" axiom—describe **non-changes** due to action
  $$\forall s \ HaveArrow(s) \implies HaveArrow(Result(Grab, s))$$

- Frame problem: find an elegant way to handle non-change
  - (a) representation: too many frame axioms
  - (b) inference: too many repeated "copy-overs" to keep track of state

- Qualification problem: true descriptions of real actions require endless caveats—what if gold is slippery or nailed down or …

- Ramification problem: real actions have many secondary consequences—what about the dust on the gold, wear and tear on gloves, …

Describing Actions

- **Successor-state axioms** solve the representational frame problem

- Each axiom is "about" a **predicate** (not an action per se):

$$P \text{ true afterwards} \quad \Leftrightarrow \quad [\text{an action made P true}$$
$$\vee \quad P \text{ true already and no action made P false}]$$

- For holding the gold:
$$\forall\, a, s \;\; Holding(Gold, Result(a, s)) \;\; \Leftrightarrow$$
$$[(a = Grab \wedge AtGold(s))$$
$$\vee (Holding(Gold, s) \wedge a \neq Release)]$$

- Initial condition in KB:
  $$At(Agent, [1, 1], S_0)$$
  $$At(Gold, [1, 2], S_0)$$

- Query: $Ask(KB, \exists s \; Holding(Gold, s))$

  i.e., in what situation will I be holding the gold?

- Answer: $\{s/Result(Grab, Result(Forward, S_0))\}$

  i.e., go forward and then grab the gold

- This assumes that the agent is interested in plans starting at S_0 and that S_0 is the only situation described in the KB

Making Plans: A Better Way

- Represent plans as action sequences $[a_1, a_2, \ldots, a_n]$

- $PlanResult(p, s)$ is the result of executing p in s

- Then the query $Ask(KB, \exists p \; Holding(Gold, PlanResult(p, S_0)))$
  has the solution $\{p/[Forward, Grab]\}$

- Definition of $PlanResult$ in terms of $Result$:
  $\forall s \; PlanResult([\,], s) = s$
  $\forall a, p, s \; PlanResult([a|p], s) = PlanResult(p, Result(a, s))$

- Planning systems are special-purpose reasoners designed to do this type of inference more efficiently than a general-purpose reasoner

Summary

- First-order logic

  - objects and relations are semantic primitives
  - syntax: constants, functions, predicates, equality, quantifiers

- Increased expressive power: sufficient to define wumpus world

- Situation calculus

  - conventions for describing actions and change in FOL
  - can formulate planning as inference on a situation calculus KB