[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next]
[Date Index]
[Thread Index]
[Author Index]
Return to main CEDA-L Archive Page
The Critique Example: Rejoinder to Jim Hanson
First, a note on the Jesuit Round Robin. I am no longer associated with it.
Due to superior proximity, that responsibility now is Greg Simerly's. Call
him at 618-453-1896.
I have two essentially parallel reactions to Jim's posting on my example of
a critique. The first will focus on substantive reaction the points Jim
makes. The second will focus on the relevance of Jim's arguments to our
discussion of the LEGITIMACY of critiques as an argument FORM. Since I
think Jim's comments mostly just demonstrate that any argument can be
pressed and have little to do with the legitimacy of the form, I was
tempted to do only the second. But, I wouldn't want Jim to call the
response a 'diversion.' So, if you think that relevance is important in
this discussion see section two. If you just want to see how I counter
Jim's claims, see section one. >> designates Jim's quotes, > designates
mine.
**************************************************************************
SECTION 1. REFUTATION
**************************************************************************
Jim makes three arguments:
ARGUMENT ONE: DECLARATIVE ARGUMENT
Jim Says:
>>--The critique reflects a declarative approach to argument
>>(which is to say it rejects reason giving). It repeatedly tells the
>>judge what he or she "must do" including that "the evaluation must
>>precede the other issues" and that the critique "must be considered
>>before substantive claims that are made within it." This is not
>>argument--this is declarative where you command someone to do something.
The first step of four-step refutation is to ACCURATELY state the argument
of the other side (I think this is even the first step of Jim's 'nine step
refutation'). Jim isn't honestly doing this, however. Jim is quoting
sentence fragments (from the shell) and leaving out the reasons (from the
shell) which follow. The phrase,
>Evaluation of the resolutional framework must precede
>evaluation of the resolutional question.
is followed by the following reasons...
>- Answering the resolutional question as interpreted would
>pre-suppose the value of its conceptual framework. If the
>impacts of the resolutional framework is questioned, then those
>questions must be resolved prior to addressing the resolutional
>question.
The phrase,
>must be considered before substantive claims that are made within it.
is preceded by the phrase
>Here evidence could be read - evidence suggesting that an
>interpretive framework, or a sphere of discourse, mediates & and
>controls the meanings that are assigned and understood within that
>framework. Hence, a reason would be supplied why the framework, the
>sphere, must be considered before substantive claims that are made
>within it.
These may not be irrefutable reasons. These certainly may not be reasons
that Jim agrees with. But, they are reasons. The first bit of analysis,
omitted from Jim's quote, suggests why a framework argument would come
first - because other arguments are embedded within, and pre-supposed by
the framework. The second bit of analysis, omitted from Jim's quote
suggest the existence of a field of literature and experts which advances
arguments (whether Jim believes them or not) regarding the ways a sphere of
discourse can control meanings within its own framework. It is only
selective quoting which allows Jim to paint these arguments as bald-faced
assertions and commands. Absent any rationale to think that the preceding
or following text DOESN'T count as reasoning, Jim himself is just making an
assertion.
ARGUMENT TWO: "GROSSLY DISTORTED CAUSAL LINKS"
>>-The reasons that are given in the critique reflect grossly distorted
>>causal links. The argument claims that the "sphere of discourse
>>controls" meaning it controls everything in the round so strongly that
>>people cannot be rational--though they will be rational enough to listen
>>to the critique as if the "militaristic" mindset suddenly disappeared
>>while evaluating the critique. The argument claims that "cost-benefit
>>analysis forces discourse of militarism" without any concern for the
>>specific affirmative proposal (see DeForeest's post) nor for the
>>incredible leap in logic one must take to believe that cba forces
>>militaristic talk (what?).
The "controls people so strongly that people cannot be rationale" part is
invented by Jim and inserted into my argument to make his task easier. You
will find it nowhere, either implicitly or explicitly, in the example that
was posted. What the "sphere of discourse controls" is "the meanings that
are assigned," (that part was left out of Jim's quote), not our ability to
think rationally. That contrivance has nothing to do with any argument
I've made or heard.
Jim argues that there is no regard to the specific affirmative proposal.
He is right. I just posted the shell. I did not construct a case for the
shell to be read against. He and Deforeest are right in suggesting that a
good debater would make the link clear, possible on case. For the sake of
argument, lets say the case is air strikes over Bosnia weighed by cost
benefit analysis: it would kill some, but save more. Here the link to
'using people as means' can be clearly seen.
Jim argues that it is a logical leap to suggest that cost benefit analysis
(in a military context, remember) can lead to militaristic discourse. It
is not a logical leap, it is an evidentiary one. One source is Simon
Dalby, the book is "the second cold war" and I think it is 1990. In any
case, this argument, like a disad, would be as strong as the evidence in
support of its link. This argument could certainly be debated out.
ARGUMENT THREE: MAKING ABSOLUTE WHAT IS NON-ABSOLUTE
>>--The critique makes absolute what is not absolute. No reason is given
>>anywhere in the argument itself to vote negative. The D point on "voter"
>>says that "If we delegitimize the framework, there is no basis for
>>affirmation as affirmative would've failed to meet the burden to affirm."
>>What? Why does this make the critique a voting issue--this is another
>>declarative that presumes the critique is a voting issue but fails to
>>justify that this is so. Ken justifies this statement with an argument
>>that the critique "must precede" other issues and this is a voter because
>>of the "affirmative's right to parametricize the round and arguments need
>>to localize debate and avoid a tie." What? What does that mean? Why
>>does this mean I should vote negative because the affirmative's case or
>>the resolution encourage militaristic discourse? There is not a reason
>>offered--and that is exactly the reason that those of us against
>>critiques have requested. At best, the argument shows that the
>>affirmative approach to the topic may (underline that word) reflect a
>>bias toward the military. So what.
The word, "What?" seems to be a favored mode of rejoinder. I'd suggest
that it would be a better cross examination question. Certainly, an
advocate would be expected to explain the reasoning in the D subpoint if
questions remained after this initial presentation (its a shell). I
interpret Jim's first "What?" as asking why the affirmative has a burden to
affirm (that's my guess - we have no clue about which part he really fails
to understand). Arguably an affirmative has a burden to affirm (to
support) the resolution due to their role in the round (as evidenced by
their name "affirmative") and also due to other reasons relating to our
need to honor a tournament contract, and our need to prevent shifting
ground. The reasoning is syllogistic: if neg wins that the framework
shouldn't be affirmed, and if the affirmative must affirm the framework to
win, then the affirmative shouldn't win. Jim's second "What" I'm guessing
relates to why a rejected framework should effect the affirmative more than
the negative; in other words, why it should not be a tie. The word
"parametrize" means the affirmative's ability to set parameters on the
resolution by picking a case. The argument is that this aff ability should
be balanced by a negative presumption. The "need to localize debate"
suggests that we need to be focusing on something consistently. The
argument is that we're focusing on affirmative of the res and failing that
ability to affirm, we would vote negative. The "need to avoid a tie"
suggests that one side must, argumentatively, bear a bigger burden than the
other. Other claims suggest that this should be the affirmative. Sure, I
am "un-packing" the analysis a bit, just as a good advocate would do in
cross examination. But, Jim's expressions of incredulity notwithstanding,
the reasons are present in the shell.
Jim makes three arguments against the critique. Most of then can be seen
as "presses" in the sense that they really amount to requests for more
information. As such, they are legitimate responses, but not indictments
on the form of the argument. Now, lets look at the relevance of this
debate.
***************************************************************************
SECTION TWO: RELEVANCE
***************************************************************************
Now, is Jim nitpicking? I posted an example of a critique, and Jim posted
some answers. I think that most would agree (though possibly not Jim)
that offering a substantive refutation of the example does nothing to
delegitimize the form. Jim succeeds at proving that an example (an outline
without evidence no less) can be substantively pressed. Jim does not
however succeed at doing anything to indicate that critique as a form of
argument is suspect. Based on the criteria I outlined on relevance, and
based on the criteria that Jim to some extent seems to use, his arguments
qualify as 'nitpicking the example' rather than addressing the issue. A
consideration for relevance is necessary to prevent this from becoming an
unsubstantiated debate on a incompletely identified position that was
offered as an example of a form. The form should be the focus.
DOES SUBSTANTIVELY DENYING AN ARGUMENT MEAN DELEGITIMIZING IT AS AN
ARGUMENT FORM??
Jim thinks, yes. He says
>Advocating critiques as an argument form means taking on the burden of
>justifying their worth
Indeed, it does mean taking of the burden of justifying the worth of having
critiques AS A FORM. But it doesn't mean taking on the burden of
justifying ANY critique as being absolutely true in the face of all
possible arguments. That same standard applied to other arguments would be
ludicrous. How about this? Jim, show me an example of a disadvantage that
'warrants a ballot.' Seriously. Post the example and I will, like you,
post back a mix of partially true and wholly false statements which deny
that the disad is true or significant enough to ballot on. This little
exercise would do nothing to delegitimize the notion of disadvantages. If
it did, then in no time I could delegitimize disads, topicality, cases,
criteria, whatever. We could get back to square one!
WHAT CRITERIA SHOULD WE USE IN EVALUATING THE EXAMPLE OF THE CRITIQUE
In a round we would use all sorts of arguments to both substantively deny
and procedurally delegitimize a critique. But since we are having a
discussion specifically about the critique's legitimacy as a procedural
form, the possible substantive denial becomes irrelevant. A potential for
substantive denial (and for subsequent refutation of that denial) just
makes an argument debatable, not procedurally suspect.
My suggested criteria is that we evaluate the example only in terms of the
ways in which its problems bear upon the problems of critiques as an
argument type.
Jim seems to agree.
>>These attacks on Ken's critique are not isolated attacks that just
>>nitpick critiques--they get at the faulty way critique advocates like Ken
>>use to make critiques a "warrant for decision." These attacks do not
>>apply to advantages, disadvantages, topicality arguments nor to
>>counterplans. They apply to critiques and only critiques and they apply
>>to critiques generally--not just the example that Ken presented.
I'll get to the question of whether is is actually true below. But I only
have one disagreement with this at a 'standards' level: I'm not defending
critiques "generally." I've made it very clear in both the article and the
posts that I am defending and defining a specific argument type which may
not mirror general practice. Aside from this, lets hold Jim to these
standards: lets apply these standards to the comments he makes. They have
to ...
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. APPLY TO THE FORM OF THE ARGUMENT, NOT JUST TO THE EXAMPLE.
2. APPLY UNIQUELY TO CRITIQUES, NOT TO OTHER ARGUMENT FORMS.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Now, lets look once again at Jim's arguments, this time focusing on their
relevance for our discussion.
ARGUMENT ONE: DECLARATIVE ARGUMENT
Jim Says:
>>--The critique reflects a declarative approach to argument
>>(which is to say it rejects reason giving). It repeatedly tells the
>>judge what he or she "must do" including that "the evaluation must
>>precede the other issues" and that the critique "must be considered
>>before substantive claims that are made within it." This is not
>>argument--this is declarative where you command someone to do something.
Remember criteria one, it must apply to the form not the example. Is
Jim really saying that the FORM of critique prevents reasons?? I don't
think so. No where does he say that it is the form of the critique that
CAUSES an absence of reasons. Both the original shell and my explanation
of it show that an absence of reasons is not intrinsic to critiques, since
we can construct a critique with normative, rather than declarative,
reasons.
Remember criteria two, it must apply uniquely to critiques not to
other arguments. Is Jim really saying that critiques are the ONLY argument
form that might include declarative statements?? I don't think so. If my
teams had won a critique ballot every time they hear the simple phrase
"topicality is a voting issue" they would've been national champions.
Certainly a declarative argument can be used in support of any position.
So Jim says that the arguments are declarative, but that has nothing
to do with the criteria that he himself says he is using to evaluate this
example.
ARGUMENT TWO: "GROSSLY DISTORTED CAUSAL LINKS"
>>-The reasons that are given in the critique reflect grossly distorted
>>causal links. The argument claims that the "sphere of discourse
>>controls" meaning it controls everything in the round so strongly that
>>people cannot be rational--though they will be rational enough to listen
>>to the critique as if the "militaristic" mindset suddenly disappeared
>>while evaluating the critique. The argument claims that "cost-benefit
>>analysis forces discourse of militarism" without any concern for the
>>specific affirmative proposal (see DeForeest's post) nor for the
>>incredible leap in logic one must take to believe that cba forces
>>militaristic talk (what?).
First criteria: applies to the form. Do critiques as a form cause
causal distortion? Only if they inevitably make the claim that the
discourse prevents rationality. Mine doesn't, so it can't be inevitable.
Only if they all focus on cost-benefit analysis and militarism, and only
then if there is never evidentiary support for that link. Certainly, Jim
isn't offering a formal critique here.
Second criteria: applies uniquely to the form. Are disadvantages,
cases, criteria, and counterplans as a form free from the potential for
distorted causality? No. Again, this is an example press and not a formal
criticism.
So Jim can't come to grips with the causal evidence here, but that has
nothing to do with the criteria for evaluating the form that he says he is
using.
ARGUMENT THREE: MAKING ABSOLUTE WHAT IS NON-ABSOLUTE
>>--The critique makes absolute what is not absolute. No reason is given
>>anywhere in the argument itself to vote negative. The D point on "voter"
>>says that "If we delegitimize the framework, there is no basis for
>>affirmation as affirmative would've failed to meet the burden to affirm."
>>What? Why does this make the critique a voting issue--this is another
>>declarative that presumes the critique is a voting issue but fails to
>>justify that this is so. Ken justifies this statement with an argument
>>that the critique "must precede" other issues and this is a voter because
>>of the "affirmative's right to parametricize the round and arguments need
>>to localize debate and avoid a tie." What? What does that mean? Why
>>does this mean I should vote negative because the affirmative's case or
>>the resolution encourage militaristic discourse? There is not a reason
>>offered--and that is exactly the reason that those of us against
>>critiques have requested. At best, the argument shows that the
>>affirmative approach to the topic may (underline that word) reflect a
>>bias toward the military. So what.
This one applies! This is the one point in his post where Jim is
addressing the form and uniquely the form. He says that there is no reason
why it could be a voting issue. Reasons are included in the shell and are
explained in response to the questions Jim Raises here in the reaction to
this argument at the end of the first section of this point. Briefly they
are, 1.) Affirmative has a burden to affirm. This burden should be a
natural consequence of their role in the debate. This burden is also
necessary if ground is to be consistent. 2.) Failing affirmation, it is
the affirmative that should lose. This argument stems from a claim that
the affirmative should have a higher burden of proof as compensation for
their ability to parametrize the round and as a natural consequence of a
need in argument to locate a burden of proof on one side of the debate.
Now, for Jim's critique to be right here there would have to be no reasons
that are possible to articulate. There DOES NOT have to be reasons which
personally convince Jim or anyone else of their veracity. Remember, we are
focused on the legitimacy of the form. If Jim can think of refutations of
the above reasons (I'm sure he can) that doesn't mean that the argument
should not be debated. The analysis in the d subpoint is certainly, like
the critique itself, in dispute. Our question at this point is, "can we
entrust this dispute to the debaters?" I am saying, "of course we can."
When Jim responds, make sure he is giving a reason WHY IT SHOULD NOT BE
DEBATED, and not just giving a reason why HE THINKS IT IS WRONG. Let us
pray that he sees a difference between the two.
Ken Broda-Bahm
broda@midget.towson.edu
Archive created by Jonathan Stanton (jonathan@cs.jhu.edu)
Return to main CEDA-L Archive Page