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CP ties and then some
One more time around on presumption...
>>I think Bill DeForrest accurately defended my position against Scott
>>Titsworth's arguments for "presumption wins when the cplan and the plan end
>>in a tie." I did want to make one comment about presumption. Scott argues
>>that there "is risk" inherent in change which is why the neg should win if
>>they do less. My question is why? If the status quo was perfect then this
>>would make sense. Why do we assume that "the risk" would be bad why isn't
>>it possible that the unforseen consequences of "action x" might be good?
>>2AC #7 extend the evidence, group the answers...
>First, I don't want you to think that I'm a big fan of decisions
>based upon presumption|
Never fear, Scott. You will not be hearing any accusations from me about
being a presumption hound. I think we can both agree that the notion
of presumption does have its problems. Whether they are insurmountable
is I guess the question, or one of them, anyway.
>Is your position then that presumption doesn't exist? Is there no
>such thing as burden of proof for overcoming presumption? The way that
>I understand your argument (and Bill's), the affirmative captures
>presumption in a counterplan round. The way that you describe your
>position, it seems that the negative now must overcome some sort
>of burden of proof. This position seems just as arbitrary as
>saying that the negative has presumption.
Hmmm. Well, I don't think I'm defending any sort of "presumption." I
am not concluding affirmative because of "risk of change" or some
other impact that is not defined or argued out. The negative has
several options in a debate, one of which is to advance a counterplan.
However, when choosing to advance a counterplan, the negative does so
as a means to negate the case. If negation is to take place, the counterplan
must be net beneficial; it must be "better" than the case. Otherwise,
as an argument unto itself, the counterplan has failed to disprove the
case. Equality is not a reason to choose. Since the counterplan has
failed in forcing me into a choice, I discard it and look at the re-
maining issues in the round.
I should give an aside here. I may have been too hasty in generalizing
my position to an affirmative ballot. In my view, since the CP has failed
to compete, it becomes an irrelevant part of the debate, very analogous
to a disad with no link. In effect, I view CP's much the same way as
disads in this respect: the "link" to a counterplan is that it competes.
Anyway, were I to conclude, absent the CP, that the DA's to the plan
still outweighed the advantages, I would still vote negative. I guess I
assumed that the reverse was true. Does this make it a 1-1-1 vote? :)
Taking the discussion one level further, I venture that there is a
corresponding burden to the affirmative that comes from the topic itself.
When we discuss inherency (stemming from the definition of should - ought
to but not necessary will - that gives some indication of (oh my) a
counterfactual/future policy), the affirmative is to demonstrate a
choice between the status quo and their plan. They are not the same, and
the aff purports to gain more advantage. If the negative proves absolute
zero advantage through lack of inherency, I can find myself voting neg.
This is not due to presumption, but a lack of affirmative proof that we
"should" do something. This is a basic topic requirement of policy
debate. The affirmative does not offer a choice, much the same way the
neg has failed to do so when presenting a non-competitive CP. However,
once the affirmative has affirmed, then the negative must negate. If that
involves a CP, then it must disprove case, not just be as good as it.
This is not giving the affirmative presumption, either, since I don't
think I can conclude that there is no way to vote absent presumption.
Either the affirmative has shown change good, or the negative has shown
aff change bad. There is no middle ground.
Before you all run out and run inherency in front of me (heaven forbid),
I am merely staking out theoretical ground. Much as Scott cannot forsee
voting on presumption, I cannot forsee voting on inherency. I have never
encountered a case that is _no_ different from the status quo and cannot
give at least some reason to change. Then again, if I hang around long
enough, who knows....
>Remember that my
>argument is not that the counterplan _always_ has presumption, just
>that the counterplan can retain presumption under certain
Agreed and understood.
>Tim and Bill's position seems to indicate that the presumption is
>either arbitrarily assigned to the affirmative, or that there is
>no such thing as presumption. Why is this a more sound way of
>breaking the tie?
My position is decidely the latter - there is no presumption. I do not
think, for the same reason Tim cites, there is necessarily any reason
to grant presumption to the current way of doing things. If anything, I
might tend to think we need to change a few things around here. But,
that is more of a philosphical question that I would prefer to avoid.
More directly, I don't think assignment of presumption is necessary.
When I am finished assigning relative weight to all the arguments, I
should weigh them out and vote one way or the other. Precise to the point
of no errors? No. But I still maintain that it is less arbitrary than
assigning an unquantifiable (maybe somewhat mystical :) ) impact to one
side and then voting.
Does that make any more sense?
Archive created by Jonathan Stanton (firstname.lastname@example.org)
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