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Re: opportunity benefits


On Sun, 25 May 1997 10:51:33 -0600 Chris Smith <cdsmith@BRAIN.UCCS.EDU>
writes:
>You write:
>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>You assume to much when you assume that the debate judge has the same
>power as a real world policy maker.  It makes more sence that the 
>judge has
>a one time, omnipotent power of fiat, after which the power
>dissapears (untill the next round of course.)  If what you say is true
>and the judge has the power to continue fiating in the future then it
>would be reasonable to believe that the judge could decide future 
>rounds
>based on arguments heard in the origional round.  DEBATE IS NOT THE 
>REAL
>WORLD!  The only way debate can be an objective activity, round to 
>round,
>is for the judge to decide to vote affirmative or negative then, for
>judging purposes, forget the previous round ever existed before 
>walking
>into the next round.  This cuts at your parallel between debate judges
>and real world policy makers.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>
>You are confusing the judge and the role that the judge assumes.  Of 
>course
>the judge doesn't continue to have powers of fiat.  It is questionable
>whether the judge ever had those powers to fiat in the first place.  
>But
>the role does.  The "U.S. policy maker" role doesn't have a one-shot
>decision-making ability.  The role has the power to making continuing
>policy decisions.  That doesn't mean round to round, because the role
>doesn't move from round to round.  The judge does that, not the role 
>that
>is assumed.  The role represents instead the decision-making of U.S.
>policy-making institutions, and continuing fiat does belong to that 
>role.

No, the role of a debate judge is to judge a debate.  Post round the
assumed role of the judge is to stand by and let the real world policy
makers do their job.  The judge can't influence those policy makers one
way or another.  The judge has one, and only one opportunity to fiat
something.  After the judge fiats or does not fiat the plan, the judge
has no more authority.  This is precisely why, in the case of an
opportunity cost counterplan, the negative must meet the burden of
uniqueness (proving counterplan inevitability.)  If this is not met then
the judge won't reject the affirmative based on an empty opportunity. 
The only way to solve this problem is if the negative accepts advocacy
of the counterplan and the judge is given the choice of fiating the
counterplan.

>>>>>>>>>>>
>Well, when different actors are tested via counterplan the role of the
>judge is non continual.  A congressman couldnt fiat a state or
>international counterplan just as an executive policy maker couldnt 
>fiat
>the congress or vice versa.  The reason the CWC was a non example was
>because the counter opportunity dosent exist.  Do you really think the
>counterplans heard in a majority of debates are real world options 
>that
>actually exist?  Most counterplans are created by debaters, not by
>policy makers, and are never real world options.  An opportunity cost
>counterplan must be grounded in real world policy options.  Just 
>because
>you have a counterplan that solves my case but doesn't link to your
>clinton disad doesn't mean policy makers would ever concider your
>option.  Only by fiating the counterplan now can the judge ever 
>concider
>it.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>
>Not really.  When different actors are tested, the judge assumes a 
>role of
>an omnipotent policy maker.  Whether or not this role is desirable is
>subject to discussion, and you already know my views on the issue.  
>But the
>role is there.  And (surprise!) that role has continuing power of 
>fiat.

Like I stated before, the judge has one shot at fiating something.  After
that the judge is as helpless as the debaters.


>>>>>>>>>>>
>Well, if you argue that the policy maker judge would continue to vote 
>I
>would say maybe.  The only thing is that after the round the judge 
>loses
>the omnipotent ability to fiat policy.  After the round the judge 
>becomes
>one of hundreds of voters and the judges decision is no longer 
>absolute.
>In this case either the judge must choose to pass by fiat the 
>counterplan
>at the end of the round or the or the negative must prove the
>inevitability of the counterplan for there to be an opportunity cost.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>
>The judge is not what we are concerned with.  For all I care, this 
>could be
>the last round adjudicated by this particular judge.  The role will
>continue.  The role will continue to make policy, to intellectually 
>endorse
>policy, whatever that role does that is equated to the concept of 
>fiat.
> Again the judge assumes the role, but the judge isn't that role.  I'm 
>not
>saying that the judge can vote for round 1's counterplan using fiat 
>powers
>from round 6.  That is just ridiculous!

Well, if your argument is true then this is exactly what you advocate. 
After a round, even with regards to the role the judge plays within the
round the judge is stripped of the power of fiat.  We go back to the
real world policy makers making policy.

>>>>>>>>>>>
>Well, if a judge has an infinate power of fiat, post round, the judge
>could choose to do any number of policies, not just the counterplan
>presented.  The judge woudnt know the effect of these policies.  If I 
>can
>prove that by fiating the affirmative the judge would not have the
>opportunity to pass some detrimental policies than the affirmative 
>would
>be more benificial than the status quo.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>
>Not really.  If you prove in the round that the counterplan is a bad 
>thing
>(straight turns, etc.) then there is very little chance the judge will 
>vote
>for it.  Therefore, you still need to compare the plan to the status 
>quo to
>win the round.  The opportunity is gone because a bad policy doesn't 
>get a
>vote.  There is, of course, the chance that the judge will vote for a 
>bad
>policy.  But even that chance is diminished in the eyes of the judge
>because you've just pointed out to an empowered policy-maker role that 
>the
>policy is bad.

Yes but the affirmative stops an infinate number of plans which are
detrimental.  They may never get debated during the round so the judge
really doesn't know that they are bad.  If thew affirmative stops the
opportunity to vote on these policies then isn't the affirmative a
benifit?  Now that I think about, that seems like a pretty good reason
why, even absent a counterplan, the affirmative should maintain
presumption.

>Chris Smith
>Woodland Park HS Debate


					Dom Battistella
					ODU Debate
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