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Re: Southworth and Tuna

	It's incredibly difficult to limit Affirmatives.  As I've said before, if
you give an inch, there are hundreds of intelligent debaters who have all
year to figure out how to take a mile.  However, while I think its
inevitable a treaties topic would be stretched by affs, I also think that
such a topic would be more limiting than Gehrke gives it credit for.  I'm
only going to answer the part of his post which focuses on how the treaties
topic could be expanded assuming that topicality is an issue which the
negative can win if given a conducive topic and that resolutional limits
are an important objective.  

Gehrke writes:

>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Every wording of the treaties topic I have seen suffers from these same
problems. Reservations are not the only ways that ratification modifies the
meaning of a treaty. Congress may also attach interpretive declarations
(uniquely different from reservations) which can radically reshape what the
treaty is thought to mean (note the interpretive declarations initiated on
the international recognition of a right to self determination). 
Likewise, the very process of ratification inevitably produces a
legislative history (congressional ratification hearings and executive
statements of meaning) that the courts often give great weight to in
determining what a treaty means and does. Finally, the executive is given
great deference by the courts in its freedom to radically alter the meaning
of a treaty after ratification. (For specific cases see the Reagan
administration's ridiculous interpretation of the ABM treaty, the O'Connor
case on the Panama Canal treaty, and the Alvarez-Machain case on the
US-Mexico extradition treaty.) 
These are considered INEVITABLE and ESSENTIAL parts of the treaty
ratification process. This is normal means. 
The net result is that I have already located about 50 pieces of evidence
which allow for a explosion of the treaties topic even given the strictest
wording provided.
All the other topics and topic areas are likewise indeterminate. 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

Gerhrke describes 3 ways in which affs could "explode" the topic

(1) Declarations -  a declaration (much like an "understanding") is a
statement from congress which describes what they feel they have obligated
themselves to do by ratifying a treaty.  Such declarations would obviously
have to be somewhat radical re-interpretations of the treaty in order for
the negative evidence on the treaty to no longer apply (and thus the
negative research burden to be expanded which I assume is the litmus test
for "fair division ground").  I assume that an aff using this "loophole"
would make an argument such as " We ratify treaty X but we declare that we
interp the treaty to only mean that we need to switch to a postmodern
society (since the argument was made by Pat :) and don't advocate doing
anything else".   I don't think this is a signifigant concern. The best
reason is that counterplans would check such abuse - any neg could simply
counterplan "switch to POMO without ratifying the treaty" and compete off
of a generic while sucking up all of case. Also, the literature provides
good arguments against such strategies - the pratice of making
declarations, understandings and reservations which radically re-interp
treaties from their original negotiated meaning  upsets the rest of the
international community and undermines the credibility of our ratification
process for obvious reasons.  Additionally, if the declaration only
modified a small part of the treaty the neg could counterplan ratify the
treaty without the declaration and compete off of the aff undermining the
treaties credibility.  Of course, if the declaration is advocated in the
literature its predictable and limited.  If its not, then the aff's ability
to solve will suffer since none of their solvency evidence will assumes
their "modifications".  Almost all treaties ratified are ratified with
declarations etc.  However, these "add-ons" are rarely signifigant enough
to alter the debate over the whether the treaty is a good or bad thing. 
Finally, even if in some instances declarations did expand aff ground, the
aff still has to take a very predictable action - ratify the treaty.  I
hope I'm not misconstruing the way in which Pat thinks declarations would
expand the topic.   Maybe he could provide a specific example to aid the
discussion. 

(2) Judicial re-interp and (3) Executive re-interp - I'm not really sure
how either of these would unlimit the topic.  I guess that an aff could
ratify a treaty and then have it interpreted to mean something different
than what the neg is prepared to debate.  The problems with this tact are
much the same as the problems with achieving the same end through the use
of declarations.  First, such a re-interp could only claim advantages to
unilateral action since other nations don't interp the treaty in the same
way and such radical modification is not assumed by the solvency authors.
Second, the neg could counterplan to do this unilateral action without
ratifying the treaty and compete off a generic.  Finally, the neg could
make the previously mentioned credibility arguments.   I think that both of
these examples are really more of neg solvency arguments than methods for
the aff to expand the topic.

	I sorta feel my discussion of these potential flaws in the treaties
topic's ability to limit is somewhat haphazard.  I think its because I'm
having to sorta guess as to exactly what argument I'm actually answering. 
Specific examples would certainly help (Pat?).  

	Treaties certainly can't guarantee affs won't expand the topic.  But, it
does a better job of giving the neg a chance to constrain the aff than most
I've seen.

	
Paul Hayes

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