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Re: solvancy and nss
Josh wrote:
>
> Many people have been asking the same solvancy questions about the NSS
>topic. These questions have begun a process of thinking that has braught me
>to the conclusion that the NSS topic, in a way, more accurately depicts a
>solvant plan, on face, than any topic could that uses congress as an actor.
:) i love josh! this reminds me of the debater who stands up in the 2ar and
says, you know i have really listened to the negative's attacks and i just
sincerely believe we are the best policy alternative! :)
> First, The congress can only enact legislation and prescribe funding for
> legislation, administration, or security. The congress cannot administer a
> darn thing. In other words, it is only through a leap in debate logic that
>we assume that a congressional action if adopted would be administrated as
> written.
so, what happens after something like the clean water act is passed? your
argument *seems* to be that nothing happens. oh contrair monfrair.
statutory language directs the implementing agency to adopt regulation
conforming with the new rules. why should we presume that congressional
action is ignored? agencies that do ignore congress typically get SUED into
complying with the law.
also, why are you assuming that the best actor on our topic is the congress?
the darn administrative agencies DO the regulating in this country. smart
affirmatives will have the doi/epa et al administer their plan. this
ELIMINATES the agent ground, and ENSURES the plan will happen, so why not do
it?
> Many of you will immediately assume that this is covered by fiat.
> This is not the case because fiat is the suspension of disbelief that a
> specific policy will be adopted as written. Administration occurs after
>the policy process has concluded and therefore is outside of the boundries
>of fiat unless the actor is the president and congress in which case the
>administration of a policy would be a part of the normal means of
>implementation.
in a separate thread josh argues that people need to write better
affirmatives; one's with solvency. i agree. affirmative that pass a bill
better have cards about how that will be implemented by the agencies. or
guess what, they don't solve anymore than the examples cited in the other
thread.
>The real world example of this phenomena occurring would be Nixon's refusal
>to administer funds as congress had allocated them during his
>administration.
is this typically how the branches interact? then why couldn't the congress
screw your resolution during the appropriations process!? that occurs right
around the time when the nss is released....
> I suppose what I am saying is that sole congressional enactment is a
>fiction and that action solely by congress incurs a solvancy deficit based
>upon congresses inability to administer policy.
guess affirmatives need to start picking cases with solvency evidence then
huh?
>Second, the President of the United States, conversely, has no such funding
> or legislative abilities but has total control over administration within
>and sometimes outside of the law (which takes an act of congress to pass).
wait, didn't you just assert the president has defacto $ authority through
the ability to not administer? hmmm... now i'm confused about which
criticisms apply to which branch.
>One area that the congress has no control (outside of funding) is that of
>national security. The prsident, as commander in cheif, is solely
>responsible for the roles and missions and administration of the armed
>forces.
oh, the president wishes it was this cut and dry. if the above is a
non-controversial statement then why does the congress ALWAYS freak out when
the president does something (albeit under the guise of ns) without
congressional approval?
>The armed forces are bound by law to follow the directives of the commander
>in chief. The results of this are that it may be true that the congress
>could refuse to fund the presidential directive for national security when
>it is represented tactically in the military forces FY Budgets but the
>military cannot refuse to follow the directive.
hmmm...and the agencies cannot refuse to not enforce the law.
> In this sense, there is no difference between the potential solvancy
>deficit that both types of actions face. Congress faces the risk that the
>president will refuse to administer the policy as intended while the
>president faces the risk that the congress will fail to fund the agencies
>responsible for administrative agencies enacting presidential directives.
whoa!
1. this begs the question of bad affirmative solvency. if the affirmative
has solvency which would have to prescribe implementation, then you are flat
wrong.
2. josh's resolution asks the affirmative to change a document. now, in the
traditional sense, josh says we make a leap in logic to assume that the plan
is implemented after congress enacts the policy and that this leap in logic
is the same. let's see, under josh's example we have to assume both that the
change is ever even translated by dod into policy and then assume that it is
implemented. how are these the same? maybe you could clarify by posting
some of this solvency evidence? thanks in advance.
i am still waiting for the answer to the question, so what? you change a
document. the internal link to solvency is WORSE THAN EVER.
> In this battle, only the president has access to mechanisms for shifting
>funding within administrative agencies. Congress has only legal avenues of
>investigation and impeachment.
and the power to appropriate or not. where do you think that funding the
president has sole access to comes from? you want to see congress get "back"
at an agency that is pissing it off? look what it tried to do this year
during approps.
>In my mind, the assumption we make every debate for assumption
> of successful congressional implementation is a larger leap in logic.
uh, don't you mean every debate without solvency?
> In terms of suceptibility to agent debates all three options (sole pres.
> action, sole cong. action, joint action) invite the other options as
>generic agent debates.
aha! what about when the agency is the actor? how silly would an agent
counterplan on the environment topic. oh yeah, we'll have the doc regulate
wastewater effluent:) nice argument. next?
> Whatever choice you make for a topic makes actor debates
> specifically linked and generically tenable. It is wrong to argue that a
> presidential actor topic is less or more vulnerable to such debates because
> the literature is the same for all three options (not even including
> action counterplans based in administrative agencies as opposed to the
>other three options).
two things:
1. i am guessing that the presidential topic is more vulnerable because
there is still controversy around the role of the president in terms of
national security. the cognress does not sit idly by when the president acts
alone. if we are debating how the government should be organized around
security issues then i bet we are also debating the role of government to
this respect.
2. you assert that the problem is worse when agencies are the actors? proof
for this claim? can you explain away jurisdiction? can you tell me the net
benefit or *other* competition for having the dod regulate wastewater
effluent as opposed to epa?
> The real problem being pointed out by most of those that mention solvancy
>as a failing of the national security topic is that there is no guarantee
>that the president can implement his/her security policies.
i am not sure you are correctly characterising the concern. many people on
this list have expressed the concern that the specific wording of changing
the document is the problem. what is the answer to this?
by the way, i agree with your underlying concern about the quality of
affirmative argument selection. many of your criticisms of the traditional
affirmative are criticisms of people manipulating evidence.
becky
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