Relevance and dispositionality

["Matthew K. Roskoski" <MROSKOSKI@VAX1.UMKC.EDU>]

My disagreement with Ken revolves largely around a distintion between types of
advocacy.  Accordingly, I will explain and justify my distinction first and
then explain how it answers Ken's arguments.

"ACTION ADVOCACY" VS. "ARGUMENT ADVOCACY" 
or 
PROCEDURAL VS. SUBSTANTIVE RELEVANCE

In debate there exist two different types of advocacy.  I label them "action
advocacy" and "argument advocacy" (see, I'm really Jesse Jackson in disguise.) 
Action advocacy is the articulation of a plan or counterplan (or policy imp or
counterpolicy imp - the label doesn't matter, the concept does.)  Argument
advocacy is a claim of (for the round) truth - such as an advantage to the plan
or a disad or a case answer etc. etc.  These two different types of advocacy
carry different responsibilities and are subject to different rules.

Action advocacy is, basically, a promise to act.  Now, it's only a promise
within the hypothetical framework of the debate (we don't expect Sean & Jason,
for example, to jump in a plan and go airstrike the Serbs), but it serves the
function of a promise.  The action advocate is saying, in the role of some
policy actor, "if you vote for me, I will do X."  Action advocacy can "go away"
in 2 situations - if it is voluntarily retracted, or if it is proven to be
"illegal."

Argument advocacy is a claim of fact.  The argument advocate is saying "letting
me do X is a good idea because it results in Y."  Argument advocacy can go away
in 2 situations - if it is proven false or if it is proven irrelvant.  (Ken and
I use the concept of relevance differently - I will clarify later).  We apply a
rule in debate that argument advocacy cannot be voluntarily retracted.  For
example, if a debater double flips, he or she can't (when the other team points
out the error) say "oh, I retract the link turn."

An analogy clarifies my distinction.  It is the analogy of a legislator
bringing a bill before committee.  Assume, for the sake of argument, that a
legislator is bringing a bill to encourage aerobic exercise before the Energy
committee of the House.  There are two advocacies associated with this action. 
The first is the action advocacy - the promise to encourage aerobic exercise. 
The second is the argument advocacy - the claim that aerobic exercise is good
for people.

Now, just as their are two kinds of advocacy, there are also two kinds of
relevance.  I think Ken confuses the two types of relevance.  Procedural
relevance focuses only on action advocacy - it asks whether or not you can be
allowed to take that action - i.e. whether or not that action is within the
jurisdiction of the body to which you appeal. 

*(I should pause here and clarify that I don't consider intrinsicness or
critiques to be procedural questions - I think they're substantive questions
and shouldn't be voting issues.  That is, however, a separate debate.  For the
purposes of this discussion, I will use topicality as the model for procedural
argument simply because it's the procedural about which there exists the
largest consensus.)*

Substantive relevance focuses on what issues matter in the evaluation of
whether or not the action is a good idea.  Procedural relevances is a semantic
issue, substantive relevance is a causal issue.  Another way of saying that is
that you decide procedural relevance at first glance and substantive relevance
through deeper resolution of issues.

My legislative analogy clarifies and supports this distinction.  Suppose, for
example, that the legislator claims that "aerobic exercise gives you more
energy."  There exists first the question of procedural relevance - is the
energy that aerobics gives the same kind of Energy that the committee has
jurisdiction over?  The important point here is that to make that decision, one
takes the claim "aerobics lead to energy" for granted - assuming they do, is it
the right kind of energy?  In other words, to decide jurisdiction the committee
analyzes the claim on face, without resolving it's truth or falsehood.  Then
there exists the question of substantive relevance - does energy actually
result from aerobics or not?  This focuses on the causal link between aerobics
and the feeling of energy.  If it is decided that the link is missing, energy
is judged irrelevant to whether or not one should promote aerobics.

The debate judge does the same thing.  On the last resolution, the judge first
had to assess procedural relevance, i.e. ask whether the action advocated
really was military intervention.  Then, the judge considered substantive
relevance - does the military intervention really produce the described
advantages and disadvantages?

Procedurals make, in other words, decsriptive claims - they CAN'T do X. 
Substantives make normative claims - they SHOULDN't do X.  The reasons to
prefer a given procedural may be normative, but the conclusion drawn is
descriptive - a non-topical plan isn't bad, it's just not something we're
allowed to do.

An affirmative must, of course, have both action and argument relevance. 
Negative's are encouraged to challenge both procedural and substantive
relevance.  Because these two issues are frequently discussed side-by-side, it
is easy to confuse the two.  This, I think, Ken does.

THE ANSWER TO KEN'S ARGUMENTS

Ken makes, basically, 4 arguments.  They are:       

1. All procedurals are also substantive 
2. Competition is procedural because it questions relevance       
3. Linking disads to noncompetitive advocacy is a critique   
4. Other arguments are kicked so counterplans should be too.

I believe the distinctions drawn above answer each of these claims.

        1. All procedurals consider substantive arguments

All procedurals do require you to "look" at substantive arguments, but they
don't require you to "resolve" substantive arguments.  Procedurals require you
to consider the substantive claims on face (i.e. the claim that
aerobics=energy) without considering the truth or falsehood of the claims. 
Subtantives focus on the truth or falsehood of the claims (i.e. do aerobics
really=energy).  The difference matters because procedurals are said to be a
priori.  For that to be the case, they logically must be resolved before the
resolution of substantive issues.  Further, real world actors such as courts
who assess jurisdiction do it that way.  They decide first whether the claims
made in the case enter their jurisdiction.  Then and only then do they assess
the truth of those claims.

The issue of non-topicality can be resolved by taking the claims made in the
counterplan on face.  One looks at the action taken by the counterplan and the
set of actions described by the resolution and compares the two.  Competition
requires that you determine the truth and falsehood of the substantive claims. 
For example, you have to decide whether or not the disads link and whether or
not particular advantages matter to resolve claims of net benefits.

     2. Competition is procedural because it questions relevance

Competition only questions substantive relevance, not procedural relevance. 
The question of procedural relevance is "is the counterplan a legitimate method
for negating?"  If it is part of the affirmative resolution, it arguably is
not.  The question of competition is a question of substantive relevance. 
Competition asks "does the plan preclude the counterplan?"  That question is
substantive because it asks not "should they be allowed to take the action in
question" but rather "if we decide we want them to take that action, does it
mean we shouldn't also take the affirmative action?"

        3. Linking disads to noncompetitive advocacy is a critique

Herein lies one of my major objections to critiques.  I think action advocacy
is a legitimate source of links, but argument advocacy is not.  (The reason
why, by the way, is that I don't believe the language creates reality claim
which is necessary to reach the conclusion that argument advocacy results in
some effect.  The convention of fiat is all that is required to conclude that
action advocacy results in an effect.)

A disad to a non-competitive counterplan is still a disad to action.  If the
negative promises to arm the Bosnians, then to vote for them you have to decide
that arming the Bosnians is (at least) not a bad idea.  A critique is a disad
to argument.  Voting on a critique makes the assumption that to vote aff, you
have to agree (just for example) that framing issues within the form of
geopolitical discourse is a good idea.

I reject critiques, at least to a large degree, because of my policy
background.  I think debates should focus on the merits of the policies
advocated, not on the words spoken or assumptions made by the debaters.  The
words or assumptions are relevant, to me, only is as much as they bolster or
undercut claims about the merits of the policies.  Thus, it is not inconsistent
for me to support linking disads to non-competitive action advocacy while still
rejecting the practice of critiquing argument advocacy.

      4. Other arguments are kicked so counterplans should be too.

The kickouts Ken describes are concessions that the other teams argument
advocacy was correct.  If I say "X=s backlash" and you say "no it doesn't" I
can agree.  Those kickouts can't occur without a concession by the other team. 
You wouldn't let me say, for example, "gosh, they're really winning that
backlash is good.  I changed my mind and hereby retract my claim that the plan
will cause a backlash."  Dispositionality, however, like conditionality,
effectively lets me do that.

I should pause here and clarify my complaint.  My beef is with the notion that
negatives should get to make any argument just disappear without any complicity
on the part of the other team and without having to defend their right to do
so.

Ken uses the example of our big stick case.  When we ran the big stick, many
people shared Ken's opinion.  Our argument then, and my argument now, is that
we weren't an AJ because we didn't ever try to make contentions go away without
the other team's complicity.  We ganted takeouts, but we didn't "cease to
advocate" any contention.  I think the distinctions drawn above clarify the
difference.

IN SUMMARY

Counterplan dispositionality is still problematic.  Disads to the counterplan
don't question the relevance (in a procedural sense) of the counterplan, they
question the desirability of the action pledged by the negative.  It should be
possible for the affirmative to concede the legitimacy of the negative's action
advocacy and strictly argue that it is undesirable.  Negatives gain quite a bit
from the priviledge of fiat.  I don't think it unreasonable to ask them to
carry some responsibilities as well.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| Matthew K. Roskoski   |  Hey!  Let's all E-Mail Val Renegar at Notre         |
| UMKC Debate Forum     |  Dame (VRENEGAR@DARWIN.CC.ND.EDU).  Tell her she     |
| Kansas City, MO       |  should let Mahoney dye his hair green...            |
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