A counterplan paradox

[Sean Upton <Sean.Upton@m.cc.utah.edu>]

It seems to me that the goal of competition theory as a mandatory 
criterion for a counterplan is put forth because the counterplan should 
be a disproof of the affirmative claim(s).

With that said, it seems that a res-focus advocate would say that a
topical counterplan is not truly "competitive" in that the resolution is
the central question, claim, or issue of the round.  If you subscribe to
the debate metaphysics of plan-focus policy making, on the other hand, it
seems that WHAT IT IS that is being refuted is the claim "plan is good" --
not "the resolution is true [or true in a context]."  With that said, I
think that the counterplan theory debate shifts entirely to the question
of what is the central question that is answered in any given particular
round... 

...and EVEN IF the central question was the resolution, as I believe
Dallas has hinted, it seems that in the context of any given round the
truth or veracity of the resolution (primary claim) is proven by proxy of
one (and only one - see tie-breaker below) particular example (plan) and
whether or not the plan is desirable.  Let's call the plan "P" and the
resolution "R": 

- P is a contextual proof for R's truth
- Supposing that P is good( and topical, of course), R is true in a given 
context (a particular round)

Now, lets suppose a counterplan (CP) creeped into the discussion.

- Supposing that CP disproves P's "goodness"
- therefore, it also guts the original truth-value of R
- But, if CP is topical, it also proves the truth of R

My primary quandry is that I see a logical paradox in the above 
argument.  It disproves, yet proves the resolution.  R is both true and 
not-true.  This ambiguity I am sure is a bit annoying to most.  There are 
two ways out:

1) plan-focus
2) Just insist that there can be only one topical advocacy

The concern I have with option number 2 is that it really doesn't address 
the issue as much as it avoids it by putting up a little jurisdictional 
roadsign:   "Don't tempt me... Don't reduce my system to absurdity."

I think that option 1 provides a (though imperfect, of course) solution 
to the logical mess involved in sorting out the paradox.  I don't think 
that option number 2 provides any sort of way out, inasmuch as it just 
masks over the inconsistencies.  It doesn't address the problematic fact 
that it is possible to have a true and false resolution, regardless 
of whether one makes an arbitrary rule to limit that situation out in the 
round.  The whole notion of resolutional truth comes into question.

And the tie-breaker: you have ambiguity.  The resolution is both false 
and true.  How do you break the tie.  You vote against the original 
advocacy, because it has been disproven.  Really just a funky presumption 
argument.

Perhaps non-related, but it seems that CP fiat is justified by its 
ability to test these claims (P and R), and is, supposing, it passes 
other test of reasonability, ontologically justified becuase counterplans 
are useful if the do actually disprove the affirmative arguments.

Not metaphysical truth - Just my 1AM rambilings,
Someone might want to correct my spelling, :)

Sean
Utah Debate

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References:

• Re: Tah-Dah! (was hey Bryant! now hey Strange!)
• From: ross smith <smithr@wfu.edu>

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