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Non-Human Animal Species Wording Paper

Here is the non-human animal species wording paper.  As I told the
committee, I had to prepare for Pi Kappa Delta meetings held this past
weekend.  I am also away from home and its many comforts (e-mail
account, computer, library, etc.) for the summer.  I want to thank Tuna
for addressing some of the concerns regarding this and other topics. 
Hopefully other issues specific to this topic will be addressed herein. 
Thanks, by the way, to Tom Preston who afforded me access to the UM-St.
Louis library.  While my time in was limited, his help enabled me to
gather enough materials with which to put this together.

Forward any questions, etc. to me at 102027,310@Compuserve.Com (my
sister-in-law's account--Aimee Adamo).

TOPIC WORDING PAPER
RESOLVED:  That the United States Federal Government should increase the
rights of non-human animal species in the United States.

By Scott Jensen, McNeese State University


	When one thinks of environmental regulation and the rationale
behind such action a number of issues come to mind.  Certainly
pollutants and ecological mindsets at or near the forefront of what the
"average" person considers mainstream environmental issues.  I think two
important issues to be dealt with in the debate over environmental
regulation are the impetus for it and the impact of it.  It is herein
that questions of rights for animals can and should be considered.

RELEVANCE OF ANIMAL RIGHTS TO THE ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS DEBATE

	We seek to regulate the environment (or NOT to regulate it)
largely because of its relationship to those things living within it. 
The EPA regulates pollution because it kills.  The Clean Water or Clean
Air acts regulate in hopes of securing safer and more enduring
environments.  Certainly an issue relevant to the debate over the
environment is its impact on animals--human and non-human.
	Benton (1993) writes:

	We, like other species of animals, have needs which require
	us to interact with our environment (living and non-living),
	and with one another if we are to survive and reproduce.
	Many of our capacities for interpreting our environment and
	adapting our responses to it, for interacting with others of
	our own species, and or developing complex social bonds and 
	relations are also shared with many, though of course not
	all, other animal species (p. 16).

	Mason (1993) argues that animals are critical in questions
involving nature:

	I submit that the Animal Question is central and fundamental
	to the Nature Question.  We simply will not be able to come to
	terms with nature unless we come to terms with animals and
	animality, because for the human mind and culture, animals are
	the most important part of nature (p. 12).

Mason later addresses the view that animals are peripheral to teh
broader environmental debate:

	We are fooling ourselves if we think we can deal with the
	big picture, the mangled mess of our relations with nature,
	without a soul-searching examination of our dealings with
	animals.  That would be about as fair and productive as an
	attempt to work out a family matter in which one refuses
	to consider either a spouse or the children (p. 277).

	As these and other authors explain, animals in a general sense
are relevant to questions of nature.  More specifically, Finsen and
Finsen (1994) place environmentalism in the same arena as animal rights.
They write that "the environmental movement, while not a 'liberation
movement,' is an important contemporary movement whose fate is tied in
with animal liberation" (p. 235).  Pluhar (1995), in her examination of
basic moral rights, brings considerations of animal rights together with
questions of ecology:

	Environmental holism, which restricts moral considerability
	to systems of living entities, according secondary status at
	best to individuals, and environmental pluralism, which accords
	moral status on different grounds to individuals and to 
	ecological systems or species, are views utterly unsuited to
	a Gewirth-like justification (p. 262).

Questions of deep ecology must, by necessity, encompass all living
things that are interdependent within nature.  The questions of to what
extent humans consume and dominate their environment envelopes those
living species--animals and non-animals--that are subject to our
consumption and domination.
	While the argument can be made that animal rights are germane to
discussions of environmental regulation, there are views that hold that
environmentalism and animal liberation bear little in common.  While the
separation of these two issues can be argued to exist, literature also
supports their inherent and important interdependence.  I am convinced
that these arguments are sufficient to endorse this resolution and its
related issues as part of this year's topic area.

AFFIRMATIVE DIRECTIONS

	There has already been discussion concerning the seemingly
limitless ground afforded affirmatives under this resolution.  While I
would be foolish to suggest that this is a narrow topic, there are some
limits to recognize.  Certainly the specified agent of action limits the
nature of the increased rights being proposed.  One could argue that the
granting of natural or moral rights would not be topical in light of
them being out of the government's jurisdiction.  While affirmatives
could advocate the importance of affording non-human animals such
status, the philosophical nature of these rights makes it difficult to
award them to any being.
	The phrase "in the United States" also limits the species whose
rights can be debated.  Certainly there remain millions of species
available to affirmatives.  Unfortunately for affirmatives the burdens
of solvency and, at least for some critics, significance are
considerations that will prevent the unbelievably narrow plan from being
advanced.
	Finally, "species" prevents affirmatives from arguing that we
should free Willy, or any other specific animal for that matter.  Plans
must extend to species as a whole.  While this is still broadly stated,
it does place a greater burden of proof on affirmatives.  Is this
resolution broad?  Yes.  Will some affirmatives make efforts to narrow
ANY resolution--broad or narrow--to microscopic extremes?  Yes.
	Specific affirmative cases are numerous.  Given the one general
mandate of increasing rights, the single assumption for affirmatives to
prove (beyond being within the topic) is that their mandate(s) increase
rights from present levels.  Linzey, in Regan and Singer's (1989) ANIMAL
RIGHTS AND HUMAN OBLIGATIONS, suggest a more fundamental starting point.
"To accept that animals have rights must involve accepting that they
should be treated differently from the way most of them are treated at
present" (p. 137).  It is here that the majority of negative ground
rests.  Countless arguments can be made for not extending rights to
non-human animals, ranging from solvency issues to the very premise that
non-human animals are incapable of managing such rights.  Specific
mandates to be argued within affirmative plans are many, as evidenced by
the following BRIEF lists of case ideas:

	any animal testing		United Nations UDHR
	vegetarianism			hunting/fishing/sport
	pet ownership			zoos
	cruelty laws			rights to liberty
	commercial animal agriculture	educational reform
					  (eg., dissection)
	formation of organizations	habitat destruction
	free range animals		ban the dog catcher :)

	The challenge for affirmatives, as suggested earlier, will be to
find the mandate that is grounded in reasonable solvency.  Making this
argument cogent will be a challenge that will help to create a more
negative-friendly resolution.

NEGATIVE DIRECTIONS

	The best negative argument is the claim that non-human animals
do not merit rights.  A number of reasons can be advanced to support
such a claim, including the following two arguments.  First, affording
rights to non-human animals is infinitely regressive.  Finsen and Finsen
(1994) write that "if we agree to grant rights to animals, then we ought
to extend our concern to all of them, including insects" (p. 237).  They
note that "you have to eat something" (p. 237).  A second argument is
that, to assume rights a being must assume accountability.  It can be
argued that the nature of non-human animals not being able to reason or
communicate as formally as humans places them in a position ill-equipped
to assume rights.
	This resolution lends itself to agents counterplans.  Solid
advocacy can be made to support private industry or states and local
communities being better suited to serve the interests of animals.  The
ground that may be richest for the negative are case turns.  There is
sufficient literature to allow negatives, for example, to argue that
biodiversity and other environmental ends are better served with the
status quo--the "circle of life" if you will.  Animals benefit us, and
if the affirmative rocks the boat, the good from the status quo goes
away.

KEY AREAS FOR RESEARCH

	Aside from the obvious (and not-so-obvious) affirmative plans,
there are issues that debaters will find critical to the debate over
animal rights.  A big area for research is, of course, ecofeminism.
	The animal rights literature is not necessarily synonymous with
animal welfare.  At best, affirmatives can argue that increasing rights
for non-human animals might contribute to their welfare.  But debates
centering exclusively, or even primarily, on welfare would not be
topical.  The AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY defines welfare as "health,
happiness, or prosperity; well-being" (1994, p. 914) while its first two
definitions for right are "(1) conforming with justice or morality (2)
in accordance with fact, reason, or truth; correct" (p. 709).  Finsen
and Finsen (1994) further distinguish between animal rights and animal
welfare movements:

	As we have argued, animal rights is an idea conceptually
	distinct from the notion of welfare implicit in the humane
	movement.  To respect the rights of animals is not to
	provide them with larger cages or to slaughter them less
	painfully; rather, it is to empty the cages and to cease
	slaughtering them.  On the other hand, the humane movement
	seeks to improve the conditions of animals while continuing
	to use them (p. 259).

They state emphatically that "the animal rights movement is and must
remain distinct from the humane movement" (p. 259).
	Debaters will also encounter the term "speciesism," explained by
Pluhar (1995):

	Anyone who believes that species membership can itself,
	independently of the capacities of the individual, be a
	morally relevant characteristic, is a speciesist (p. 79).

This is a necessary issue when considering the extent to which a species
should or should not have its rights increased.

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

	The argument has already been made that this resolution falls
within the debate over environmental regulation.  An argument even more
intuitive than those previously advanced is that the question of
increasing rights at the governmental level can be interpreted as
regulation.  That our environment incorporates all orders of living
things certainly encompasses non-human animals.
	There are obviously generic arguments than become more specific
within this resolution.  Ecofeminism is perhaps the biggest issue, aside
from rights, that comes into the mainstream of debatability within this
topic.  However, simply debating non-human animal species does not mean
that the generic species debate is relevant.  The focus on rights makes
generic species arguments STILL generic (absent an affirmative that
focuses on extinction issues).
	The ground is large, but the issues are interesting.  I don't
agree with some of the criticism of this topic area--we debate the
environment every year and this will be a year of meatballs from the
past.  I do, however, suggest that under this resolution, unlike the
other five, we can deal with issues less prevalent under past topics.


(Bibliography will be sent within a separate post.)
Archive created by Jonathan Stanton (jonathan@cs.jhu.edu)
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