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critique - answering lovechild
ONCE MORE, THE DISTINCTION
This is becoming more clear I think.
>why are the discursive acts placed in a privileged realm,
separate >from the acts that have a physical (non-discursive, if
my >professors will forgive me for suggesting that such a thing
>exists) acts? The real things we do during the two hours of the
>debate are what matters.
There must be a reason why the critique would be a voting issue
given that we debate originates in the context of a given topic.
If I were supporting military intervention and you said "you're
wearing leather shoes - that kills cows!" I would say, "you're
right, but military intervention is STILL good." Your response
is true, perhaps more important for 'real life' then the claims I
am making, but it is still ultimately non-sequiter as a response
to my argument. For a critique to move beyond this level of ad
hominem and to the level of relevence in the debate round, there
would have to be a reason why it would precede the resolutional
question. One COULD argue that simply by having more 'real
world' impact it would precede the resolutional question. This,
however, seems to be Texas' argument, not mine. To me, greater
importance alone is not a reason to supplant discussion on other
issues. If that standard held sway then discourse could only
happen on one issue: the absolutely most important one. My
position has always been that an argument reaches the level of
critique only when it contains a argumentative dimension that
imparts negative value to the consideration of the resolutional
question. This is the "blah blah blah" Lovechild refers to.
Let me use simpler language: answering the resolutional question
causes bad things! That dimension has been contained in only one
of the examples that have been thrown against me (the English
language one, which is below). I am not suggesting that these
acts which negate resolutional value are more important than
other acts, just more relevant to a debate that is presumptively
focusing on a resolutional statement. Lovechild is right in
saying that physical actions such as using the wrong kind of
paper may be just as important or even more important than the
language we use, and if debate were just an open-ended contest to
come of who can claim the biggest (or most 'real') impact then
these arguments would matter, but given that we're presumptively
debating a topic, a critique needs to have a reason why that
presumption should be overthrown in favor of a prior focus on the
framework in which resolutional evaluation takes place.
>I was under the impression that one of the fundamental
>underpinnings of the Kritik was an assertion that the events of
>the debate which are external to the thought-experiment were
>actually more important than the odd cyberworld of
>FIAT-constructed reality. If that's true, then bad paper becomes
>an impact. I can't see any other way to view it.
I think that external events ARE ultimately more important and I
think that this premise is an important PART of the critique
argument - not the whole thing. Whether Texas does it or not, I
think it is simplistic and ultimately untenable to say that
greater importance alone establishes the critique. That
argument is at the level of saying 'we know the topic is privacy,
but prolif is more important.' Because the topic is not our sole
means of discourse, the presence of a more important issue does
not automatically kick the topic out the door. The 'reality' of
discourse impacts is a tool to induce judges who have been
conditioned to evaluating only in a fiated world to give the
argument a hearing and to resist the presumption that the focus
is on answering the resolutional question. But I still think
another level needs to be present - 'given our argument, it would
be bad to give the resolutional question precedence, because
given our argument further consideration of the resolutional
question has negative value.' Paper IS an impact, but it is not
an impact that would PRECEDE the resolution in importance. There
still is not any reason why it would.
>The theoretical tenet that affirmatives (both sides, actually)
>must defend assumptions is pragmatically disastrous. A line of
>germanity may need to be drawn.
Absolutely. My 'line of germanity' is what I have been trying to
articulate since the beginning of this thread. It is this: the
critique must give a reason why it must precede the resolutional
question. The best reason it would precede is because the
resolution would create a framework would would logically require
justification before it could be used.
For the sake of subscriber disk space I'll grant that many
critiques carry 'vague intellectual baggage,' offer hasty
generalizations, and have an overly static view of language.
I'll even grant that people with brains can substantively deny
anti-semetic and patriarchal arguments. I'm not saying that all
or most critque arguments are good, true, and necessary.
>You next make the point that extreme examples of the theory's
>application don't dejustify it. I think they do,...
...and then you return to the English language argument, but you
never give a reason why justifying the acceptability of ANY
critique arguments entails the justification of ALL critique
arguments. Why can't teams respond that a given critique lacks a
link, assumes a wrong view of language, or is peripheral to the
THE ENGLISH-LANGUAGE CRITIQUE
The recycled paper example lacks a reason for preceding the
resolutional question. So does the prep-time example. Both
arguments would be true, but non-germane to voting in the round.
The one example that might arguably meet would be english
language: 'answering the res question would require english, so
english as a framework must be subjected to prior evaluation.'
And the mere possibility of this sets off Lovechild:
>which is my problem with the English Language kritik. What is
the >answer to that? What is the theoretical barrier to it? And
yet, >how can we debate it? Even beyond the answer of "cut some
cards", >don't you feel a certain absurdity washing over you at
the thought >of defending English?
Yes, I'm swimming in absurdity. If we allow disadvantages we
also give "theoretical legitimacy" to a disadvantage saying
underground nuclear testing is good because it causes the 'little
people in the earth' (as described by a Berkeley street
newspaper) to come out and establish peace and world government.
The reason why we don't dejustifify disadvantages as a result of
this possibility (Berkeley ran it years ago) is that 'theoretical
legitimacy' is a necessary but not sufficient condition for
winning the disad. Same goes for the English critique. It might
be an interesting debate but I think that problems of internal
consistency (if it was delivered in english), question-begging
(if it wasn't), accidental fallacy (if it is non-essential that
the dominators spoke English), causality (if alternative factors
are responsible), incommensurability (if languages are complete
conceptual systems which cannot be externally critiqued), etc,
would prevent the practical application of this argument. No
theoretical system admits only perfect arguments. I also find it
absurd to indict the existence of 'people in the earth' but I
don't use that to theoretically delegitimize disadvantages.
Theoretic rationale is only a minimal condition for argument
acceptability - it must also be a good argument, and refutation
is the check for that.
>The comparison between kritiks and disadvantages is absolutely
>untenable. Link evidence is far more difficult to find than an
I think I've answered the basis for this above. I'm not saying
that all assumptions could be challenged in a way that would
precede the resolutional question in importance. Given the need
for resolutional precedence, negative critique ground would not
be ALL assumptions aff makes, but would be limited to the
questioning of frameworks that necessarily come before
resolutional evaluation. Given the examples on this thread,
finding a genuine critique that has a reason for coming prior to
the resolutional question seems to be more difficult to find by
far than a disadvantage link.
Up to this point, I've been allowing responders to pick the
examples that I am supposedly defending. Most seem to be either
general ad hominems against arguers or (as in the case of
Lovechild's UT examples) arguments that refute case and carry
critique label only to incease their status. To clarify, I would
consider the following a critique argument on the current CEDA
topic: resolved that U.S. military intervention to foster
democratic government is appropriate in a post-Cold War world. I
am defending it's theoretical legitimacy only. Like other
arguments, I think it can be substantively denied.
A. Evaluation of the resolutional framework must precede
evaluation of the resolutional question.
- Answering the resolutional question as interpreted would would
pre-suppose the value of its conceptual framework. If the
impacts of the resolutional framework is questioned, then those
questions must be resolved prior to addressing the resolutional
B. Aff interprets the topic as requiring militaristic discourse.
The topical focus on military action combined with the
affirmative's requirement that in order to win we need to show
that the costs of a military action exceed its benefits place us
in the context of the discourse genre of militarism. [link
evidence: military discourse means the weighing of costs and
benefits in terms of lives, geopolitical advantage, etc.] Aff's
interpretation forces this framework on both sides.
C. Militaristic discourse is harmful
[many impacts here - use your imagination]
D. Voting issue.
- If we deligitimize the framework, there is no basis for
affirmation as aff would've failed to meet the burden to affirm.
This burden is justified as an absolute burden as a consequence
of aff's exclusive right to parametrize the round and due to the
argumentative need to localize debate and avoid a tie.
I hope this clarifies. I realize i'm not supporting all that
goes under the label "critique" (or, psuedo-radically, "kritik.")
I may be defending a specific type of critique in lovechild's
view. In any case, lets strive at least as an intial step to
characterize what we mean when we say "critique" as I think that
what I am defending is very different from what Rosen and
Lovechild are indicting.
Archive created by Jonathan Stanton (firstname.lastname@example.org)
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