[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next]
[Date Index] [Thread Index] [Author Index]
Return to main CEDA-L Archive Page

Re: national security strategy (fwd)


---------- Forwarded message ----------
Date: Sun, 28 Apr 1996 10:57:22 -0400 (EDT)
From: Robert James Mckown <rmckown@emory.edu>
To: Michael J Gottlieb <mjgottlieb@NWU.EDU>
Cc: Multiple recipients of list NDT-L <NDT-L@UGA.CC.UGA.EDU>
Subject: Re: national security strategy



On Sat, 27 Apr 1996, Michael J Gottlieb wrote:

> At 06:11 PM 4/27/96 -0400, Catherine Elizabeth Shuster wrote:
> > I think after viewing Clinton's "National Security Strategy" paper that
> >almost anything the affirmative wants to be topical will be. The
> >resolutions proposed simply say "change"- which does not even limit the
> >affirmative to items inside this report, and argue that said change
> >changes our national security strategy by acknowledging previously
> >ignored threats (from whatever source). Clinton himself says in the
> >report which was posted that the way the US implements its national
> >security strategy is regionally and bilaterally. A change in
> >implementation of this strategy, or the substance of the strategy, or
> >entirely new strategies are all changes in the NSS and easily defended as
> >topical.
> 
> Couple of problems with what you say here.  First, as josh has described
> the topic, the plan must be akin to issuing a new paper.  Meaning if you
> only make one change, the rest of the paper passes as is.  The implication
> of this is that although there may be a large number of potential
> affirmatives, there are in the same manner an infinite number of
> disadvantages.  IE--- find some cards saying Clinton will change x or y in
> his next NSS, and your DA is that the Aff issues the paper without that
> change, the change is good.


I really confused as to how this works.... First Im not really sure 
whether, even if your statement is true, we could even consider this a 
good thing.. If it's true (which I dont think it is) that the plan has to 
re-release an entirely new NSS paper.. and if it's true (which I dont 
think it is) that anything Clinton may do in the future to that paper is 
a disad to the aff's new paper then that just means yet anohter generic 
strategy to be run every round.. Further... going back to why I think 
this is a load of crap anyway.. the neg would have to prove that Clinton 
 wouldn't just resubmit another paper post plan with the addition he 
wants....Thats a tight thresh to prove.. Also, I dont understand why we 
just cant ammen the NSS paper.. Your right it may not have ever been done 
before.. and your right it might not be normal means.. and tour right it 
might not be the normal procedure you follow, and your right it may take 
a lot form your fiot wand......but BFD... all of those are not disads.. 
This just proves my earlier point that the neg inev will always apt
(if they dont wont to take the case straightup which is a distinct 
possiblity with the topic so big) to CP out the 
plan through other means (non NSS  means) and claim NSS 
trivialization..or guidepostsas the net benefit. 
Wippppeeeeeeee theres your debate topic folks.. Have fun!!

  Further, josh has also argued that crafting a
> new strategy would be more substantial than changing our DSP policy.  I'm
> sure there would be 4 or 5 mainstream Affs which completely revamped our
> national security policy.  I'm also relatively sure that the neg could find
> good definitions of our national security policy and argue persuasively that
> the Aff must change it in whole.  I don't think it's as big as you say.
> 
> 
> 
>  See Jamie McKown's post earlier about the problematic idea that
> >this
> >resolution can be limited in any real way. We brainstormed for a while
> >last night and came up with a short list of topical affirmatives:
> >
> >Agile strategy (whatever that means), Virtual Disarm, disarm, iran, DLR,
> >Counterproliferation, Pivotal States, Economic Espionage, GWEN/HARP, War
> >Powers, Counterterrorism (softline or hardline), Rogue States doctrine,
> >CTBT, CWC, BWC, Start II, CFE, BDRP, ABM, SDI (or any kind of NMD),
> >Counterforce/countervalue targeting, Korematsu/FEMA, Civil defense, UN
> >RDFs, Reorganize info-gathering/procurement/reform the NSA/CIA, JSAPS,
> >Infowar, MTR, Drug interdiction (both ways), export controls, China, SIOP
> >reform, MIC/LIC doctrines, Humanitarian interrvention (both ways),
> >readiness (any number of ways), changes in procurement strategy and
> >policy, oil, base pollution, troop rotations, troop or base withdrawals,
> >loose nukes, international organized crime policy, Cuba, FBMS/ naval
> >rules of the road/sub-bumping, Merchant Marine, Nuclear safety tech,
> >Bosnia, Nuclear winter models, Korea, NATO- expand it, stop expansion,
> >pull out, Japan (both ways), GATT/WTO/NAFTA/Trade Strategy, Currency
> >Stabilization, ASATS/Space Dominance, ASW, DSPs, and ALL GLOBAL
> >ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS, as well as domestic economic growth promotion.
> >
> 
>   First, these would all be subject to the DA ground I explained above.
> Second, look--- every single one of these small cases will be subject to
> multiple counterplans that compete on Clinton or some other NB because they
> aren't intrinsically tied to the president changing national security
> policy.  Using the executive forces limits in the resolution, I feel like

> this subject has been adequately discussed on previous posts, are you
> ignoring them?  How could Affs ever win against good Negative teams on this
> topic unless their plan had an intrinsic reason why the president had to do
> the plan, or damn good Clinton impact turns?  This not only will stop
> debates from breaking down into Clinton debates all the time, it will limit
> the possible number of cases.  Affs will be forced to choose plans which
> require executive action in a substantial strategy area, and you'll be able
> to find DAs if  you just research the NSS.
> 
> 
> 
> >And, as far as we can tell, no one has yet answered the agent CP
> >objections that we have repeatedly raised. It's one thing to debate
> >Clinton in every debate. It's another thing not to have the case to weigh
> >against it.
> >
> 
> See above.  Also, how exactly does this jive with your argument that the
> topic would have too many possible Affs.  You're agreeing that Clinton w/ a
> congress CP would be a persuasive strategy in many instances, meaning 1)
> Affs will choose strategic cases (explained above) 2) as a result there will
> be less Clinton debates and a small number of cases.
> 
> 
> 
> A couple of other things.  It's obvious you two favor the environment topic.
> That's nice.  I think it's a good topic, like this one.  However, i don't
> see the
> need to trash every aspect of other topics in attempts to win over the crowd.
> The environment topic as well would have thousands of possible Affs.  Like
> this one.  However, terms of the resolution combined with certain
> counterplan ground would likely limit out the bad cases and produce the same
> core Affirmatives that win the majority of rounds.  One more thing to throw
> in, people in my class ( in the NDT division) have debated homelessness, THE
> ENVIRONMENT, health care, immigration, and the Middle East.  Next years'
> freshman, sophomores, and juniors (MORE THAN HALF OF THE DEBATE POPULATION)
> will have never debated the Commander In Chief topic.  Having to choose
> between occasional agent debates in exchange for a diverse number of cases
> doesn't seem that bad to me.  Whereas, I don't know how excited I am about
> debating fossile fuels, hazardous waste regulations, or the environmental
> tyranny of the multinational corporation again.  Remember Kate, you've
> debated your four years, some of us are just starting...  while CIC sees
> recent to you, it's nonexistent to me.
> 
> Michael J Gottlieb
> Northwestern CAS '99
>
Archive created by Jonathan Stanton (jonathan@cs.jhu.edu)
Return to main CEDA-L Archive Page