One-way Functions

601.642/442: Modern Cryptography

Fall 2019
Today’s Agenda

- Provable security basics
  - Modeling “real-world” adversaries
  - Defining security against such adversaries
- One-way Functions (OWFs)
  - Motivation
  - Definitions: Strong and Weak OWFs
  - Candidate OWF
How to model the adversary?

- **Adversary’s Resources:** Is the adversary an all powerful entity or does it have bounded computational resources?

- **Adversary’s Strategy:** Can the adversary use its resources anyway it likes or is it restricted to certain strategies?
Adversary Model

**Goal:** Model real-world adversaries

- In practice, *everyone* has bounded computational resources.
- Therefore, it is reasonable to model the adversary as such an entity.
- However, we do not make any assumptions about adversarial strategy. Adversary can use its bounded computational resources however intelligently it likes.
Turing machines capture all types of computations that are possible.

So our adversary will be a computer program or an algorithm, modeled as a Turing machine.

Our adversary will also be efficient (read as computationally feasible)

Computational Security: Security against efficient adversaries

Information-theoretic Security: Security against inefficient adversaries

In this course, we will primarily focus on computational security
Definition (Algorithm)
An algorithm is a deterministic Turing machine whose input and output are strings over the binary alphabet $\Sigma = \{0, 1\}$.

Definition (Running Time)
An algorithm $\mathcal{A}$ is said to run in time $T(n)$ if for all $x \in \{0, 1\}^n$, $\mathcal{A}(x)$ halts within $T(|x|)$ steps. $\mathcal{A}$ runs in polynomial time if there exists a constant $c$ such that $\mathcal{A}$ runs in time $T(n) = n^c$.

An algorithm is efficient if it runs in polynomial time.
Randomized Algorithms

**Definition (Randomized Algorithm)**

A *randomized algorithm*, also called a *probabilistic polynomial time Turing machine* (PPT) is a Turing machine equipped with an extra *randomness* tape. Each bit of the randomness tape is uniformly and independently chosen.

- Output of a randomized algorithm is a distribution.
- This notion captures what we can do efficiently *ourselves*. (uniform TMs)
The adversary might use a *different* algorithm for each input size, each of which might be efficient.

This still counts as efficient since he is using polynomial time resources!

We call this a *non-uniform* adversary since the algorithm is not uniform across all input sizes.
Non-Uniform PPT

Definition (Non-Uniform PPT)

A non-uniform probabilistic polynomial time Turing machine $A$ is a sequence of probabilistic machines $A = \{A_1, A_2, \ldots\}$ for which there exists a polynomial $p(\cdot)$ such that for every $A_i \in A$, the description size $|A_i|$ and the running time of $A_i$ are at most $p(i)$. We write $A(x)$ to denote the distribution obtained by running $A_{|x|}(x)$.

- Our adversary will usually be a non-uniform PPT Turing machine. (most general)
A function is one-way if it “easy to compute,” but “hard to invert”

Necessary for the existence of most cryptographic primitives (e.g., encryption, digital signatures)

Also sufficient for some cryptographic primitives (e.g., pseudorandom functions, secret-key encryption, digital signatures)

OWFs are at the bottom of the cryptographic “complexity zoo;” hence the natural first primitive for study
How to define one-way functions?

- Specifically, how to formalize “hard to invert”?
Basing Security on Computational Intractability
Asymptotic Cost of Attack

- How does the running time of computation scale as the input length goes to infinity?
- Exponential-time (e.g., $\Theta(2^n)$) \(^1\) “brute-force” attacks do not scale well
- But polynomial-time algorithms do (especially if exponent is small)
- **Disclaimer:** Using polynomial time as a synonym for efficient might be confusing since, e.g., $\Theta(n^{1000})$ is poly-time and $\Theta(n^{\log \log n})$ is not, yet the latter may likely be more “efficient” in practice
- Nevertheless, the reason why polynomial time is very useful is because of **closure property:** repeating a poly-time algorithm polynomial times is still polynomial time!

\(^1\)For $n = 128$, this roughly amounts to a billion human civilizations worth of computational effort.
Examples

- **Efficient Algorithms known**
  - Computing GCDs
  - Arithmetic mod N
  - Inverses mod N
  - Exponentiation mod N

- **Efficient Algorithms not known**
  - Factoring Integers
  - Discrete Logarithm
  - Square roots mod composite N
  - Solving “noisy” linear equations

In this class, we will mostly focus on algorithms on *classical* computers. Indeed, even in the second category, most problems, except last one are known to have efficient quantum algorithms.
Recall that we allow adversaries to be randomized algorithms, so it is important to also consider their success probability.

Consider an adversary who simply guesses the inversion. Clearly, it is efficient and has non-zero chance of success. However, the success probability is extremely low $\frac{1}{2^n}$. We will not care about such blind guessing attacks.

On the other hand, if say the adversary had a $\frac{1}{2}$ chance of success, then clearly we should worry about it. Ideally, we want the probability to be “very low.” But what is low enough?

Just like running time, we will use an asymptotic approach to capture low success probability so that it can be tweaked as desired by changing the input length (often referred to as the security parameter).
Negligible Functions

- A blind guessing adversary may “amplify” his success probability by guessing polynomial (say \( n^c \)) times, to achieve \( \frac{n^c}{2^n} \).
- This is still very low when \( n \) is large. Indeed, \( \frac{1}{2^n} \) approaches zero so fast that it cannot be “rescued” by any polynomial.
- We want to formalize this property so as to rule out the possibility that a PPT adversary is able to amplify very low success probability to “non-trivial” success probability.

**Definition (Negligible Function)**

A function \( \nu(\cdot) \) is negligible if for every polynomial \( p(\cdot) \), we have

\[
\lim_{n \to \infty} p(n) \nu(n) = 0
\]
A negligible function approaches zero so fast that you can never catch up when multiplying by a polynomial

Alternatively: A negligible function decays faster than all “inverse-polynomial” functions

**Definition (Negligible Function)**

A function $\nu(n)$ is negligible if for every $c$, there exists some $n_0$ such that for all $n > n_0$, $\nu(n) \leq \frac{1}{n^c}$. 
**Defining One Way Functions: Attempt 1**

**Attempt 1:** A function $f : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^*$ is a one-way function (OWF) if it satisfies the following two conditions:

- **Easy to compute:** there is a polynomial-time algorithm $C$ s.t.
  $\forall x \in \{0, 1\}^*$,
  \[
  \Pr[C(x) = f(x)] = 1.
  \]

- **Hard to invert:** for every non-uniform PPT adversary $A$, for any input length $n \in \mathbb{N}$
  \[
  \text{Probability of Inversion is Negligible}
  \]
Defining One Way Functions: Attempt 1

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- **Hard to invert:** for every non-uniform PPT adversary $A$, for any input length $n \in \mathbb{N}$
  \[
  \Pr[A \text{ inverts } f(x) \text{ for random } x] \leq \text{negligible}.
  \]

This is called **average-case** hardness.
Defining One Way Functions: Attempt 1

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  \[ \forall x \in \{0, 1\}^*, \Pr[C(x) = f(x)] = 1. \]

- **Hard to invert:** for every non-uniform PPT adversary $A$, for any input length $n \in \mathbb{N}$
  \[ \Pr[x \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^n; A \text{ inverts } f(x)] \leq \text{negligible}. \]
One Way Functions: Definition

Definition (One Way Function)

A function \( f : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^* \) is a one-way function (OWF) if it satisfies the following two conditions:

- **Easy to compute:** there is a polynomial-time algorithm \( C \) s.t.
  \[ \Pr[C(x) = f(x)] = 1. \]

- **Hard to invert:** there exists a negligible function \( \nu : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{R} \) s.t.
  for every non-uniform PPT adversary \( A \) and \( \forall n \in \mathbb{N} \):
  \[ \Pr \left[ x \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^n, x' \leftarrow A(1^n, f(x)) : f(x') = f(x) \right] \leq \nu(n). \]

- Note that adversary receives \( n \) as an input in unary. **Think: Why?**
- The above definition is also called strong one-way functions.
**Injective or 1-1 OWFs:** each image has a *unique* pre-image:

\[ f(x_1) = f(x_2) \implies x_1 = x_2 \]

**One Way Permutations (OWP):** 1-1 OWF with the additional conditional that “each image has a pre-image”

(Equivalently: domain and range are of same size.)
Existence of OWFs

- Do OWFs exist? NOT Unconditionally — proving that \( f \) is one-way requires proving (at least) \( P \neq NP \).
- However, we can construct them ASSUMING that certain problems are hard.
- Such constructions are sometimes called “candidates” because they are based on an assumption or a conjecture.
Consider the **multiplication** function \( f_\times : \mathbb{N} \times \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N} \):

\[
f_\times(x, y) = \begin{cases} 
\bot & \text{if } x = 1 \lor y = 1 \\
x \cdot y & \text{otherwise}
\end{cases}
\]

The first condition helps exclude the trivial factor 1.

Is \( f_\times \) a OWF?

**Clearly not!** With prob. 1/2, a random number (of any fixed size) is even. I.e., \( xy \) is even w/ prob. \( \frac{3}{4} \) for random \((x, y)\).

Inversion: given number \( z \), output \((2, z/2)\) if \( z \) is even and \((0, 0)\) otherwise! (succeeds 75% time)
Factoring Problem (continued)

- Eliminate such trivial small factors.
- Let $\Pi_n$ be the set of all prime numbers $< 2^n$.
- Choose numbers $p$ and $q$ randomly from $\Pi_n$ and multiply.
- This is unlikely to have small trivial factors.

Assumption (Factoring Assumption)

For every (non-uniform PPT) adversary $A$, there exists a negligible function $\nu$ such that

$$\Pr \left[ p \leftarrow \$ \Pi_n; q \leftarrow \$ \Pi_n; N = pq : A(N) \in \{p, q\} \right] \leq \nu(n).$$
Factoring Problem (continued)

- Factoring assumption is a well established conjecture.
- Studied for a long time, with no known polynomial-time attack.
- Best known algorithms for breaking Factoring Assumption:
  \[ 2^{O(\sqrt{n \log n})} \quad \text{(provable)} \]
  \[ 2^{O\left(\frac{3}{n \log^2 n}\right)} \quad \text{(heuristic)} \]
- Can we construct OWFs from the Factoring Assumption?