One Way Functions (Part II)

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- Modeling adversaries as non-uniform PPT Turing machines
- Negligible functions
- Definitions of strong OWFs
- Multiplication function and Factoring assumption

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- Weak OWFs and candidate f_{\times}
- Proving f_{\times} is a weak OWF based on factoring assumption
- Yao's hardness amplification: from weak to strong OWFs

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Recall: Multiplication Function

- Recall the function $f_{\times} : \mathbb{N}^2 \to \mathbb{N}$.
- Observation 1: If randomly chosen x and y happen to be primes, no PPT \mathcal{A} can invert (except with negligible probability). Call it the **GOOD** case.
- If GOOD case occurs with probability > ε,
 ⇒ every PPT A must fail to invert f_× with probability at least ε.
- Now suppose that ε is a non-negligible function (think of it as inverse polynomial, i.e., ¹/_{p(·)} for some polynomial p(·).)
 ⇒ every A must fail to invert f_× with non-negligible probability.
- This is already useful!
- Usually called a **weak** OWF.

Definition (Weak One Way Function)

A function $f : \{0, 1\}^* \to \{0, 1\}^*$ is a *weak one-way function* if it satisfies the following two conditions:

• Easy to compute: there is a polynomial-time algorithm C s.t. $\forall x \in \{0, 1\}^*$,

$$\Pr\left[\mathcal{C}(x) = f(x)\right] = 1.$$

• Somewhat hard to invert: there is a non-negligible function $\varepsilon : \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{R}$ s.t. for every non-uniform PPT \mathcal{A} and $\forall n \in \mathbb{N}$:

$$\Pr\left[x \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n, x' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(1^n, f(x)) : f(x') \neq f(x)\right] \ge \varepsilon(n).$$

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Back to Multiplication

- Can we prove that f_{\times} is a weak OWF?
- Remember the GOOD case? Both x and y are prime.
- If we can show that GOOD case occurs with non-negligible probability, we can prove that f_{\times} is a weak OWF.

Theorem

Assuming the factoring assumption, function f_{\times} is a weak OWF.

- Proof Idea: The fraction of prime numbers between 1 and 2^n is non-negligible!
- Chebyshev's theorem: An *n* bit number is a prime with probability $\frac{1}{2n}$

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- Let GOOD be the set of inputs (x, y) to f_{\times} s.t. both x and y are prime numbers
- When $(x, y) \in \text{GOOD}$, adversary cannot invert $f_{\times}(x, y)$ (due to hardness of factoring)
- Suppose adversary inverts with probability 1 when $(x, y) \notin \text{GOOD}$
- But if $\Pr[(x, y) \in \text{GOOD}]$ is non-negligible, then overall, adversary can only invert with a bounded non-negligible probability
- Formally: Let $q(n) = 8n^2$. Will show that no non-uniform PPT adversary can invert f_{\times} with probability greater than $1 \frac{1}{q(n)}$

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Proof via Reduction

Goal: Given an adversary A that breaks weak one-wayness of f_{\times} with probability at least $1 - \frac{1}{q(n)}$, we will construct an adversary B that breaks the factoring assumption with non-negligible probability

Adversary B(z):

1
$$x, y \leftarrow {}^{\$} \{0, 1\}^n$$

2 If x and y are primes, then
$$z' = z$$

$$w \leftarrow A(1^n, z')$$

• Output w if x and y are primes

Analysis of *B*:

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- Since A is non-uniform PPT, so is B (using polynomial-time primality testing)
- A fails to invert with probability at most $\frac{1}{q(n)} = \frac{1}{8n^2}$
- B fails to pass z to A with probability at most $1 \frac{1}{4n^2}$ (by Chebyshev's Thm.)
- Union bound: B fails with probability at most $1 \frac{1}{8n^2}$
- B succeeds with probability at least $\frac{1}{8n^2}$: Contradiction to factoring assumption!

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- How can we construct strong OWFs?
- Can we modify f_{\times} to construct a strong OWF?
- Or better yet, can we convert a strong OWF from any weak OWF?

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• Yao's Hardness Amplification: YES!

Theorem (Yao)

Strong OWFs exist if and only weak OWFs exist

- This is called hardness amplification: convert a somewhat hard problem into a really hard problem
- <u>Intuition</u>: Use the weak OWF many times
- <u>Think</u>: Is f(f(...f(x))) a good idea?

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Theorem

For any weak one-way function $f : \{0,1\}^n \to \{0,1\}^n$, there exists a polynomial $N(\cdot)$ s.t. the function $F : \{0,1\}^{n \cdot N(n)} \to \{0,1\}^{n \cdot N(n)}$ defined as

$$F(x_1,\ldots,x_N(n)) = (f(x_1),\ldots,f(x_N(n)))$$

is strongly one-way.

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• <u>Think</u>: Show that when f is the f_{\times} function, then F is a strong one-way function

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Weak to Strong OWFs: Intuition

- Recall: OWFs only guarantee average-case hardness
- GOOD inputs: hard to invert, BAD inputs: easy to invert
- A OWF is weak when the fraction of BAD inputs is **non-negligible**
- In a strong OWF, the fraction of BAD inputs is **negligible**
- To convert weak OWF to strong, use the weak OWF on **many** (say N) inputs independently
- In order to successfully invert the new OWF, adversary must invert ALL the N outputs of the weak OWF
- If N is sufficiently large and the inputs are chosen independently at random, then the probability of inverting all of them should be small

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Weak to Strong OWFs: Intuition

- The above intuition does not quite work as you expect because even though the instances are chosen independently, adversary gets to see them all together and does not have to invert them independently.
- Nevertheless, it can be shown via a non-trivial proof that hardness does amplify for one-way functions (albeit not all the way to exponentially small inversion probability there are counterexamples to this!)
- In fact, hardness amplification is not a general phenomenon; for other cases such as interactive arguments (we will study later), hardness does not amplify in general

- We will show that Yao's hardness amplification works for f_{\times}
- The general case requires a different and careful proof; see lecture notes for details

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Theorem

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Assume the factoring assumption and let $m = 4n^3$. Then, $\mathcal{F}: (\{0,1\}^{2n})^m \to (\{0,1\}^{2n})^m$ is a strong OWF:

$$\mathcal{F}((x_1, y_1), \dots, (x_m, y_m)) = (f_{\times}(x_1, y_1), \dots, f_{\times}(x_m, y_m))$$

- Intuition: Recall that by Chebyshev's Thm, a pair of random *n*-bit numbers are both primes with prob $\frac{1}{4n^2}$
- When we choose $m = 4n^3$ pairs, then the prob that no pair consists of primes is at most e^{-n} , which is negligible

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Hardness Amplification for f_{\times} : Proof Details

- Let $N = 2n \cdot 4n^3 = 8n^4$. Let $(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}) = (x_1, y_1), \dots, (x_m, y_m)$
- Suppose \mathcal{F} is not a strong OWF. Then, \exists a non-uniform PPT adversary A that inverts \mathcal{F} with prob at least $\varepsilon(2n)$ for some non-negligible function $\varepsilon(\cdot)$
- We will use A to construct a non-uniform PPT adversary B that breaks the factoring assumption

Adversary $B(z^*)$:

2 Compute $\mathbf{z} \leftarrow \mathcal{F}(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y})$

③ If $\exists i$ s.t. (x_i, y_i) are both primes, then:

- Replace z_i with z^* (only once)
- Compute $(\mathbf{x}', \mathbf{y}') \leftarrow A(1^N, \mathbf{z})$
- Output (x'_i, y'_i)

In Else, fail

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- Easy to verify that *B* is PPT
- Also, easy to verify that A feeds the correct input distribution to B, except with prob e^{-n}
- Overall, B fails with prob at most $(1-\varepsilon(2n)+e^{-n}<(1-\frac{\varepsilon(2n)}{2})$
- Thus, B succeeds with prob at least $\frac{\varepsilon(2n)}{2}$, which is a contradiction

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