Pseudorandomness - I

601.642/442: Modern Cryptography

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Pseudorandomness - I

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- Your computer needs "randomness" for many tasks every day!
- Examples:
 - encrypting a session-key for an SSL connection (login)
 - encrypting your hard-drive for secure backup
- How does your computer generate this randomness?
 - true randomness is difficult to get
 - often, a lot of it is required (e.g. disk encryption)

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- Common sources of randomness:
 - key-strokes
 - mouse movement
 - power consumption
 - ...
- These processes can only produce so much true randomness

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Can we "expand" few random bits into many random bits?

- Many heuristic approaches; good in many cases, e.g., primality testing
- But not good for cryptography, such as for data encryption
- For crypto, need bits that are "as good as truly random bits"

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- Suppose you have *n* uniformly random bits: $x = x_1 \| \dots \| x_n$
- Find a **deterministic** (polynomial-time) algorithm G such that:

-
$$G(x)$$
 outputs a $n+1$ bits: $y = y_1 \| \dots \| y_{n+1} \|$

- y looks "as good as" a truly random string $r = r_1 \| \dots \| r_{n+1}$
- $G: \{0,1\}^n \to \{0,1\}^{n+1}$ is called a **pseudorandom generator** (PRG)
- <u>Think</u>: What does "as good as truly random" mean?

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As good as truly random

- Should have no obvious patterns
- Pass **all** statistical tests that a truly random string would pass
 - Number of 0's and 1's roughly the same
 - ...
- Main Idea: No efficient test can tell G(x) and r apart!
- Distributions:

$$\left\{x \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n : G(x)\right\} \quad \text{and} \quad \left\{r \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{n+1} : r\right\}$$

are "computationally indistinguishable"

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- <u>New crypto language</u>: Computational Indistinguishability & Prediction Advantage
- Defining Pseudorandomness using the above
- A complete test for pseudorandom distributions: Next-bit prediction
- Pseudorandom Generators
 - Small expansion
 - Arbitrary (polynomial) expansion

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• <u>Distribution</u>: X is a distribution over sample space S if it assigns probability p_s to the element $s \in S$ s.t. $\sum_s p_s = 1$

Definition

A sequence $\{X_n\}_{n\in\mathbb{N}}$ is called an ensemble if for each $n\in\mathbb{N}$, X_n is a probability distribution over $\{0,1\}^*$.

• Generally, X_n will be a distribution over the sample space $\{0,1\}^{\ell(n)}$ (where $\ell(\cdot)$ is a polynomial)

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- Captures what it means for two distributions X and Y to "look alike" to any efficient test
- Efficient test = efficient computation = non-uniform PPT
- No **non-uniform PPT** "distinguisher" algorithm *D* can tell them apart
- i.e. "behavior" of D on X and Y is the same
- <u>Think:</u> How to formalize?

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Computational Indistinguishability

- Scoring system: Give D a sample of X:
 - If D say "Sample is from X" it gets +1 point
 - If D say "Sample is from Y" it gets -1 point
- D's output can be encoded using just one bit: 1 = "Sample is from X" and 0 = "Sample is from Y"
- Want: Average score of D on X and Y should be roughly same

$$\Pr\left[x \leftarrow X; D(1^n, x) = 1\right] \approx \Pr\left[y \leftarrow Y; D(1^n, y) = 1\right] \Longrightarrow$$
$$\left|\Pr\left[x \leftarrow X; D(1^n, x) = 1\right] - \Pr\left[y \leftarrow Y; D(1^n, y) = 1\right]\right| \leqslant \mu(n).$$

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Definition (Computationally Indistinguishability)

Two ensembles of probability distributions $X = \{X_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ and $Y = \{Y_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ are said to be *computationally indistinguishable* if for every non-uniform PPT D there exists a negligible function $\nu(\cdot)$ s.t.:

$$\Pr\left[x \leftarrow X_n; D(1^n, x) = 1\right] - \Pr\left[y \leftarrow Y_n; D(1^n, y) = 1\right] \leqslant \nu(n).$$

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Another way to model that X and Y "look the same":

- Give D a sample, either from X or from Y, and ask it to guess
- If D cannot guess better than 1/2, they look same to him
- For convenience write $X^{(1)} = X$ and $X^{(0)} = Y$. Then:

Definition (Prediction Advantage)

$$\max_{\mathcal{A}} \left| \Pr[b \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}, t \leftarrow X_n^b : \mathcal{A}(t) = b] - \frac{1}{2} \right|$$

 \bullet Computational Indistinguishability \Leftrightarrow Negl. Prediction Advantage

Proof of Equivalence

$$\begin{aligned} \left| \Pr\left[b \leftarrow \{0,1\}; z \leftarrow X^{(b)}; D(1^{n}, z) = b \right] - \frac{1}{2} \right| \\ &= \left| \Pr_{x \leftarrow X^{1}} [D(x) = 1] \cdot \Pr[b = 1] + \Pr_{x \leftarrow X^{0}} [D(x) = 0] \cdot \Pr[b = 0] - \frac{1}{2} \right| \\ &= \frac{1}{2} \cdot \left| \Pr_{x \leftarrow X^{1}} [D(x) = 1] + \Pr_{x \leftarrow X^{0}} [D(x) = 0] - 1 \right| \\ &= \frac{1}{2} \cdot \left| \Pr_{x \leftarrow X^{1}} [D(x) = 1] - (1 - \Pr_{x \leftarrow X^{0}} [D(x) = 0]) \right| \\ &= \frac{1}{2} \cdot \left| \Pr_{x \leftarrow X^{1}} [D(x) = 1] - \Pr_{x \leftarrow X^{0}} [D(x) = 1] \right| \end{aligned}$$

 \implies Equivalent within a factor of 2

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Lemma (Prediction Lemma)

Let $\{X_n^0\}$ and $\{X_n^1\}$ be ensembles of probability distributions. Let D be a n.u. PPT that $\varepsilon(\cdot)$ -distinguishes $\{X_n^0\}$ and $\{X_n^1\}$ for infinitely many $n \in \mathbb{N}$. Then, $\exists n.u. PPT \mathcal{A} s.t.$

$$\Pr[b \stackrel{s}{\leftarrow} \{0, 1\}, t \leftarrow X_n^b : \mathcal{A}(t) = b] - \frac{1}{2} \ge \frac{\varepsilon(n)}{2}$$

for infinitely many $n \in \mathbb{N}$.

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Properties of Computational Indistinguishability

- <u>Notation</u>: $\{X_n\} \approx_c \{Y_n\}$ means computational indistinguishability
- Closure: If we apply an efficient operation on X and Y, they remain indistinguishable. That is, \forall non-uniform-PPT M

$$\{X_n\} \approx_c \{Y_n\} \implies \{M(X_n)\} \approx_c M\{Y_n\}$$

Proof Idea: If not, D can use M to tell them apart!

• Transitivity: If X, Y are indistinguishable with advantage at most μ_1 ; Y, Z with advantage at most μ_2 ; then X, Z are indistinguishable with advantage at most $\mu_1 + \mu_2$. *Proof Idea:* use $|a - c| \leq |a - b| + |b - c|$ (triangle inequality)

Lemma (Hybrid Lemma)

Let X^1, \ldots, X^m be distribution ensembles for m = poly(n). Suppose D distinguishes X^1 and X^m with advantage ε . Then, $\exists i \in [1, \ldots, m-1]$ s.t. D distinguishes X_i, X_{i+1} with advantage $\geq \frac{\varepsilon}{m}$

Used in most crypto proofs!

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