## One Way Functions (Part II)

### 600.442: Modern Cryptography

Fall 2016

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- Modeling adversaries as non-uniform PPT Turing machines
- Negligible and noticeable functions
- Definitions of strong and weak OWFs
- Factoring assumption
- Candidate weak OWF  $f_{\times}$  based on factoring assumption

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- Proving  $f_{\times}$  is a weak OWF
- Yao's hardness amplification: from weak to strong OWFs

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# Recall

### Definition (Weak One Way Function)

A function  $f : \{0, 1\}^* \to \{0, 1\}^*$  is a *weak one-way function* if it satisfies the following two conditions:

• Easy to compute: there is a PPT algorithm C s.t.  $\forall x \in \{0,1\}^*$ ,

$$\Pr\left[\mathcal{C}(x) = f(x)\right] = 1.$$

• Somewhat hard to invert: there is a noticeable function  $\varepsilon : \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{R}$  s.t. for every non-uniform PPT  $\mathcal{A}$  and  $\forall n \in \mathbb{N}$ :

$$\Pr\left[x \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n, x' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(1^n, f(x)) : f(x') \neq f(x)\right] \ge \varepsilon(n).$$

Noticeable (or non-negligible):  $\exists c \text{ s.t. for infinitely many } n \in \mathbb{N}, \\ \varepsilon(n) \ge \frac{1}{n^c}.$ 

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• Multiplication function  $f_{\times} : \mathbb{N} \times \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{N}$ :

$$f_{\times}(x,y) = \begin{cases} \perp & \text{if } x = 1 \lor y = 1\\ x \cdot y & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

#### Theorem

Assuming the factoring assumption, function  $f_{\times}$  is a weak OWF.

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- Let GOOD be the set of inputs (x, y) to  $f_{\times}$  s.t. both x and y are prime numbers
- When  $(x, y) \in \text{GOOD}$ , adversary cannot invert  $f_{\times}(x, y)$  (due to hardness of factoring)
- Suppose adversary inverts with probability 1 when  $(x, y) \notin \text{GOOD}$
- But if  $\Pr[(x, y) \in \text{GOOD}]$  is noticeable, then overall, adversary can only invert with a bounded noticeable probability
- Formally: let  $q(n) = 8n^2$ . Will show that no non-uniform PPT adversary can invert  $f_{\times}$  with probability greater than  $1 \frac{1}{q(n)}$

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## Proof via Reduction

**Goal:** Given an adversary A that breaks weak one-wayness of  $f_{\times}$  with probability at least  $1 - \frac{1}{q(n)}$ , we will construct an adversary B that breaks the factoring assumption with non-negligible probability

### Adversary B(z):

$$1 x, y \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} 0, 1^n$$

**2** If x and y are primes, then 
$$z' = z$$

$$\bullet \ w \leftarrow A(1^n, z')$$

• Output w if x and y are primes

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#### Analysis of *B*:

- Since A is non-uniform PPT, so is B (using polynomial-time primality testing)
- A fails to invert with probability at most  $\frac{1}{q(n)} = \frac{1}{8n^2}$
- B fails to pass z to A with probability at most  $1 \frac{1}{4n^2}$  (by Chebyshev's Thm.)
- Union bound: B fails with probability at most  $1 \frac{1}{8n^2}$
- B succeeds with probability at least  $\frac{1}{8n^2}$ : Contradiction to factoring assumption!

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Theorem (Yao)

Strong OWFs exist if and only weak OWFs exist

• This is called hardness amplification: convert a somewhat hard problem into a really hard problem

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### Theorem (Yao)

Strong OWFs exist if and only weak OWFs exist

- This is called hardness amplification: convert a somewhat hard problem into a really hard problem
- <u>Intuition</u>: Use the weak OWF many times
- <u>Think</u>: Is f(f(...f(x))) a good idea?

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# Weak to Strong OWFs

- GOOD inputs: hard to invert, BAD inputs: easy to invert
- A OWF is weak when the fraction of BAD inputs is **noticeable**
- In a strong OWF, the fraction of BAD inputs is **negligible**
- To convert weak OWF to strong, use the weak OWF on **many** (say N) inputs independently
- In order to successfully invert the new OWF, adversary must invert ALL the N outputs of the weak OWF
- If N is sufficiently large and the inputs are chosen independently at random, then the probability of inverting all of them will be very small

#### Theorem

For any weak one-way function  $f : \{0,1\}^n \to \{0,1\}^n$ , there exists a polynomial  $N(\cdot)$  s.t. the function  $F : \{0,1\}^{n \cdot N(n)} \to \{0,1\}^{n \cdot N(n)}$  defined as

$$F(x_1,\ldots,x_N(n)) = (f(x_1),\ldots,f(x_N(n)))$$

is strongly one-way.

• <u>Think</u>: Show that when f is the  $f_{\times}$  function, then F is a strong one-way function

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# **Proof Strategy**

• Since f is weakly one-way, let  $q(\cdot)$  be a polynomial s.t. for any adversary A, probability of inverting f is at most  $1 - \frac{1}{q(n)}$ 

• Set N s.t. 
$$\left(1 - \frac{1}{q(n)}\right)^N$$
 is small. Observe:

$$\left(1 - \frac{1}{q(n)}\right)^{nq(n)} \approx \left(\frac{1}{e}\right)^n$$

- Suppose F is not a strong OWF. Then there exists adversary A and polynomial  $p'(\cdot)$  s.t. A inverts F with probability at least  $\frac{1}{p'(nN)} = \frac{1}{p(n)}$
- <u>Think</u>: How to use A to construct adversary B for f?
  - Feed input  $(y, \ldots, y)$  to A?
  - Feed input  $(y, y_2, \ldots, y_N)$  to A where  $y_2, \ldots, y_N$  are computed using randomly chosen  $x_2, \ldots, x_N$ ?

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### Adversary $B_0(f, y)$ :

- Choose  $i \xleftarrow{\hspace{0.1em}\$} [N]$  and let  $y_i = y$
- For every  $j \neq i$ , sample  $x_j \in \{0,1\}^N$  and let  $y_j = f(x_j)$
- Let  $(z_1, \ldots, z_N) \leftarrow A(1^{nN}, y_1, \ldots, y_N)$
- If  $f(z_i) = y$ , output  $z_i$ , else output  $\perp$

### Adversary B(y):

• Run  $B_0(f, y) \ 2nN^2p(n)$  times and output the first non- $\perp$  answer

# Analysis of ${\cal B}$

### Strategy:

- Define GOOD as the set of inputs x to f s.t.  $B_0$  inverts f(x) with noticeable probability  $\alpha(n)$
- Choose  $\alpha(n)$  s.t. when  $x \in \text{GOOD}$ , B fails to invert f(x) with negligible probability. That is, B succeeds in inverting f(x) for  $x \in \text{GOOD}$  with high probability
- Prove that  $x \in \text{GOOD}$  with high probability
- Now, even if B always fails when  $x \notin \text{GOOD}$ , overall, B will still succeed in inverting with noticeable probability

Think: Details?