


Secure Computation - II

(Garbled Circuits)


Lecture 14


Secure Two-Party Computation from Garbled Circuits



Garbled Circuits


[Yao86]






Garbled Circuits


[Yao86]





Garbled Circuits

[Yao86]



Goal: “Garble” (Circuit= C , input= x) s.t. ($C_{\text{garble}}, x_{\text{garble}}$) only reveals $C(x)$

Syntax

- **Two algorithms:** ($Garble$, $Eval$)
 - $Garble(C)$ outputs (C_{garble}, x_{garble})
 - $Eval(C_{garble}, x_{garble})$ outputs a value z

Syntax

- **Two algorithms:** ($Garble, Eval$)
 - $Garble(C)$ outputs (C_{garble}, x_{garble})
 - $Eval(C_{garble}, x_{garble})$ outputs a value z
- Correctness:

For every (C, x) ,

$$\Pr[C(x) = Eval(C_{garble}, x_{garble}) \mid (C_{garble}, x_{garble}) = Garble(C, x)] \\ = 1 - \text{negl}(n)$$

Security

There exists a PPT simulator **S** s.t. for every (C, x) ,

$$(C_{\text{garble}}, x_{\text{garble}}) \sim \mathbf{S}(1^n, C, C(x))$$

where $(C_{\text{garble}}, x_{\text{garble}}) = \text{Garble}(C, x)$


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
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- Hiding C : Use universal circuit and pass C as input to the universal circuit




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
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- Pick random **labels** W_0, W_1 for each wire




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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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


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
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Garbled Circuits

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


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
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


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
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


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
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Interpreting the output:

- For every output wire, reveal the mappings (b, W_b)

Secure Computation from Garbled Circuits

Goal: Compute $f(x,y)$



x



y

Secure Computation from Garbled Circuits

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x

1. Garbled circuit f_{garble}
2. Garbled input x_{garble}



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Problem: How to transmit y_{garble} ?

Secure Computation from Garbled Circuits

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All Labels for 2nd input



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y_{garble}



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- Alice learns nothing about y

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


Want:

- Alice learns nothing about y
- Bob does not learn the other labels


Oblivious Transfer

[Rabin81, Even-Goldreich-Lempel-85]



Oblivious Transfer

[Rabin81, Even-Goldreich-Lempel-85]



Want:

- Alice does not learn b
- Bob does not learn W_{1-b}